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IN MEMORIAM
On June 28, 2011 32-year old York 
Regional Police Constable Garrett 
Styles was killed after being  dragged 
by a vehicle while making  a traffic 
stop at approximately 4:50 am.
He had stopped a vehicle being  driven by an 
unlicensed 15-year-old boy. As he spoke to the 
driver, the van suddenly accelerated and dragged 
Constable Styles.
The vehicle rolled over, trapping  Constable Styles 
underneath it. Despite being  severely injured, he 
was able to radio for assistance and advise 
dispatchers and other officers of the situation.
Constable Styles was transported to South Lake 
Regional Health Centre in Newmarket where he 
succumbed to his injuries.
The driver of the vehicle that struck him was taken 
into custody and charged with first 
degree murder.
Constable Styles had served with 
the York Regional Police Service 
for seven years. He is survived by 
his wife and two young children. 
!"#$%&'(%()&*+
,-.'*/01234'05637'849':4;<=2>;<41'07%7'?@#'.AB
!"#$%&'!(%)*+,-
A PEER READ PUBLICATION
('>49;54<<41'346C<43'<C'CD41E<2C>E5'DC52/4'CFF2/41;'E/1C;;'012<2;G'%C5H=I2E7
04'J=E1<'E>3'J<EK'JEF4?C5H=4','$;;H4'L
*E1/GM(D125'LNN,
$8'*&*"O$(#
./# 01234# 56# 5++7# 85,9:12,;<=#
(;/>?1@<:#A1/B:<#C:>>B:2# ;D# ?4:# E1F1<#
G;<B3:# A:H12?I:/?# J1># D1?1<<9# >4;?#
=K2B/L#1#=2KL#@K>?#B/#M2;>>12=6#NK:@:3O#
PB># H12?/:2# (;/>?1@<:# $?:H41/:#
Q;2@:>#J1>#J;K/=:=#B/#?4:#12IO
(;/>?1@<:>#C:>>B:2#1/=#Q;2@:>#41=#
@::/# H12?# ;D# 1# <12L:# >BIK<?1/:;K>#
3213R=;J/# ;/# 1# =2KL,=:1<B/L#
/:?J;2R#JB?4# >:1234#J1221/?># ;K?#
D;2#:BL4?#<;31?B;/>6#>BS#B/#E1F1<#1/=#
?J;#B/#M2;>>12=O
(;/>?1@<:# C:>>B:2# 41=# @::/#
1>>BL/:=#?;#?4:#I;21<B?9#1/=#=2KL#>TK1=#;/<9#;/:#J::R#
@:D;2:#4B>#=:1?4O#P:#41=#@::/#1#H;<B3:#;DDB3:2#D;2#*U#
9:12>O
(;/>?1@<:# C:>>B:2# B># >K2FBF:=# @9# 4B>#
JBD:6# J4;# 1<>;# >:2F:># 1># 1# H;<B3:#
3;/>?1@<:6# 1/=# ?J;# 9;K/L# =1KL4?:2>#
1L:>#*+#1/=#*5O
VB?4# ?4:# =:1?4# ;D# (;/>?1@<:# C:>>B:26# 1# ?;?1<# ;D# *W#
H;<B3:#;DDB3:2>#41F:#<;>?#?4:B2#<BF:>#?;#LK/DB2:#;F:2#?4:#
H1>?#*+#9:12>O#.?4:2#;DDB3:2>#RB<<:=#@9#LK/DB2:#B/3<K=:)
!""#$
# # !"#$%&'()*+&,-*."/,0&1)$
# # XK<9#*Y6#5++Y#
# # &(0G#$1>R1?34:J1/
* * !"#$%&'()*2"'3#*!&4),"#
# # XK<9#*U6#5++Y#
# # &(0G#$1>R1?34:J1/
# # !"#$%&'()*5"6#*7%83#$"#
# # 019#U6#5++Y
# # VB/=>;2#G;<B3:#$:2FB3:#./?12B;#
#
!""%$
* !"#$%&'()*9&(),3)*:31#&-
# # A:3:I@:2#*86#5++U
# # E1F1<#G;<B3:#A:H12?I:/?
#
* * !"#$%&'()*7#%6"#;*:",0"#
# # 01234#W6#5++U
# # &(0G#Z<@:2?1
#
* * !"#$%&'()*<3"#30)*5"6#$%"#
# # 01234#W6#5++U
# # &(0G#Z<@:2?1
* * !"#$%&'()*.,"-8*+;,"(
# # 01234#W6#5++U
# # &(0G#Z<@:2?1
* !"#$%&'()*=)%),*>-63)4&##
# # 01234#W6#5++U
# # &(0G#Z<@:2?1
!""&$
* * !",?",&(*5&4)$*:&(("@&;
# # Q:@2K129#5-6#5++8
# # &(0G#Z<@:2?1
!""!$
* * !"#$%&'()*.)#"3%*<AB-/;),
# # Q:@2K129#5-6#5++5
# # 0;/?2:1<#G;<B3:#$:2FB3:
#
!""'$
* * * !"#$%&'()*C)##3$*>%,"#1D/3((
# # # A:3:I@:2#5*6#5++*#
# # # &(0G#01/B?;@1
# # # !"#$%&'()*5/,1)#*>))@&(0
# # # 01234#U6#5++*
# # # &(0G#"K/1FK?
!"#$%&'( )**+%&$( ,"-.( /&0"$+12( 314&5( 161+2172&( 18(
---9":0;9"$4<%1.1:1
E6
);
*&
,)
*"
/,
*6
),
")
$F*
G
)*
$6
&(
(*#
"%
*H"
,1
)%
*%6
)4
F
E6
);
*&
,)
*"
/,
*6
),
")
$F*
G
)*
$6
&(
(*#
"%
*H"
,1
)%
*%6
)4
F
E6
);
*&
,)
*"
/,
*6
),
")
$F*
G
)*
$6
&(
(*#
"%
*H"
,1
)%
*%6
)4
F
E6
);
*&
,)
*"
/,
*6
),
")
$F*
G
)*
$6
&(
(*#
"%
*H"
,1
)%
*%6
)4
F
Source: Officer Down Memorial Page available at www.odmp.org/canada
“They Are Our Heroes. 
We Shall Not Forget Them.”
inscription on Canada’s Police and Peace Officers’ Memorial, Ottawa
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Unless otherwise noted all articles are 
authored by Mike Novakowski, MA, LLM. The 
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information purposes only and are not to be 
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necessarily the opinions of the Justice Institute 
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here are some of its 
most recent acquisitions that might be of interest to 
police. 
The 8 dimensions of leadership:  DiSC strategies 
for becoming a better leader
Jeffrey Sugerman, Mark Scullard, Emma Wilhelm.
San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 
c2011.
BF 637 L4 S875 2011
Appreciative inquiry: change at the speed of 
imagination.
Jane Magruder Watkins, Bernard Mohr, Ralph Kelly.
San Francisco, CA : Pfeiffer, c2011.
HD 58.8 W388 2011
Coping  with post-traumatic stress disorder: a 
guide for families.
Cheryl A. Roberts.
Jefferson, N.C. : McFarland & Co., c2011.
RC 552 P67 R63 2011
Educa t iona l  gamep lay and s imu la t ion 
environments: case studies and lessons learned.
[edited by] David Kaufman, Louise Sauvâe.
Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference, c2010.
LB 1029 G3 E34 2010
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AGGRAVATED ASSAULT: NO NEED 
TO PROVE INTENTION TO 
MAIM, WOUND, OR DISFIGURE 
R. v. Nanemahoo, 2011 ABCA 182
A man was on his deck socializing 
with family and friends when he saw 
three young  people running  in the 
alley near his home. It was about 
midnight. He grabbed a golf club 
and confronted a group of 10 young  people behind 
his garage. The group attacked him with razor-like 
objects. He was also punched and kicked, which 
resulted in significant injuries. His face, head, and 
throat were slashed and his left ring  finger was cut, 
causing  tendon damage. Four young  people, 
including  the accused, were apprehended shortly 
after the altercation. The accused had blood on one 
of his shoes and the victim’s blood on his jacket. He 
also had possession of the victim’s golf club, which 
also had the victim’s blood on it. An X-Acto-type 
blade, partially wrapped in black electrical tape, was 
found 1-2 feet from where the accused was 
detained. Fibres found on the blade matched fibres 
from the accused’s jacket. He was charged with 
aggravated assault and two counts of possessing  a 
weapon. 
The accused was found not guilty of the aggravated 
assault charge in the Alberta Court of Queen’s 
Bench. Instead, he was convicted of the lesser and 
included crime of assault causing 
bodily harm, as well as two 
weapon offences. The trial judge 
found the accused, a willing 
participant in the mob beating, had 
kicked the victim and exacerbated 
his injuries in doing  so. However, 
the judge was not satisfied beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the 
accused had used any form of 
weapon during  the assault or that 
he personally caused the victim’s 
specific injuries. 
The Crown challenged the trial 
judge’s ruling  before the Alberta 
Court of Appeal submitting  that the 
trial judge erred by requiring  proof that the accused 
used a weapon or that he personally caused the 
specific injuries that wounded, maimed, or 
disfigured the victim. The Crown also claimed that 
the judge erred in assessing  the mens rea needed for 
aggravated assault.
Party to the Offence: s. 21 Criminal Code
The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made 
a legal error by requiring  proof that the accused 
used a weapon and/or personally caused the 
particular injuries that resulted in the wounding, 
maiming, or disfigurement. This was a group attack 
and the party to an offence provisions under s. 21(1)
(b) of the Criminal Code (CC), which states that 
“every one is a party to an offence who ... (b) does 
or omits to do anything for the purpose of aiding  any 
person to commit it,”  applied. The accused’s actions 
made him a party to aggravated assault. He “aided 
the actual stabbing  by ... removing  the golf club 
from the complainant, thereby depriving  him of 
some form of protection,” said the Court of Appeal. 
“Furthermore, ... he participated in the actual assault 
by kicking  the complainant.” Thus, the trial judge 
erred in requiring  that the Crown prove the accused 
used a weapon or personally caused the specific 
injuries to the victim.
Mens Rea 
The judge required that the accused have an 
intention to wound, maim or 
disfigure the victim along  with the 
objective foresight of the specific 
wounds resulting  from the assault or 
the knowledge that others had 
weapons in their possession and 
were prepared to use them. This was 
a mistake. The trial judge erred in 
assessing  the mens rea necessary for 
the offence of aggravated assault. 
“The mens rea for aggravated assault 
i s the mens rea fo r assau l t 
simpliciter plus the objective 
foresight of the risk of bodily harm,” 
said the Court of Appeal. I t 
continued:
“There is no requirement of 
proof of an intention to 
maim, wound or disfigure 
the complainant. At law, the 
same mens rea applies to 
aggravated assault as it 
does to assault causing 
bodily harm. The only 
difference between those 
two offences is the extent 
of the injuries occasioned 
to the victim.”  
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There is no requirement of proof of an intention 
to maim, wound or disfigure the complainant. At 
law, the same mens rea applies to aggravated 
assault as it does to assault causing bodily harm. 
The only difference between those two offences 
is the extent of the injuries occasioned to the 
victim. In convicting  the [accused] of the lesser 
charge of assault causing bodily harm, the trial 
judge must have held that the [accused] had the 
mens rea as would be required for assault 
causing  bodily harm which is the same mens rea 
as required for aggravated assault.
By virtue of the provisions of section 21(1)(b) of 
the Criminal Code, the [Crown] need not show 
that the [accused], as a party to the offence, had 
any greater mens rea than the actual perpetrator 
and in particular need not establish an objective 
foresight of the specific wounds resulting  from 
the assault. [paras. 22-23]
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the assault causing 
bodily harm conviction was vacated, and a finding 
of guilt was imposed for aggravated assault. The 
matter was sent back to the Alberta Court of Queen’s 
Bench for sentencing.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
DENUNCIATION & DETERRENCE 
KEY IN SENTENCING OF ATTACK 
ON OFFICER
R. v. Patton, 2011 ABCA 199
After hearing  squealing  tires and 
seeing  a car parked halfway into the 
road blocking  a truck, a school 
resource police officer approached 
the two vehicles and an altercation 
ensued. When the officer was kneeling  on the back 
of a man he was arresting  while using  both hands for 
handcuffing, the 20-year-old accused kicked the 
officer in the side of the head. The officer was 
seriously injured from the kick, having  to attend a 
brain injury program and undergoing  eight months 
of physiotherapy. The harm he suffered prevented 
him from returning  to his regular work duties for 16 
months after the incident and he continued to suffer 
migraines and neck problems.
The accused pled guilty in the Alberta Court of 
Queen’s Bench to assault causing  bodily harm and 
uttering  threats to cause bodily harm. He had a 
minor criminal record that arose after this incident; 
he was convicted and sentenced to breaching  a 
recognizance and obstructing  a peace officer after 
the attack but before sentencing  on it. The judge 
described the kick as “a very severe”, “football-
styled kick” that was intended to, and did, “inflict 
serious injury”. The officer was completely 
vulnerable to attack while making  an arrest and 
received no warning  of it. The assault was a 
“cowardly” and “extremely serious attack on a 
police officer” and denunciation and deterrence 
became the key sentencing factors. 
The Crown sought a global sentence of four to five 
years imprisonment, less four months credit for a 
Charter breach arising  from police misconduct 
following  the arrest and six months credit for the 
time spent in custody. Defence counsel, on the other 
hand, suggested a sentence range of between 12 to 
18  months, less the 10 months credit proposed by 
Crown and a further two months credit for the time 
the accused spent in custody after his bail was 
revoked. The judge imposed a global sentence of 48 
months in jail. He then subtracted 22 months; 12 
months for the guilty plea, four months for the 
Charter breach, and six months for the time served 
before being  released on bail. Thus, the accused had 
26 months left to serve.
The accused appealed his 48 month sentence 
arguing  the judge erred by failing  to follow similar 
precedents and not properly applying  relevant 
sentencing  principles, while also giving  undue 
weight to aggravating  factors and insufficient weight 
to mitigating  ones. But the Alberta Court of Appeal 
disagreed: 
๏ The police officer was in a position of extreme 
vulnerability when the accused kicked him. The 
officer was in the process of securing  handcuffs 
on another person and was kneeling  on or 
against the back of that person. He was prone 
with his head at perfect level for an effective 
kick to it.
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๏ The victim was a peace officer executing  his 
duty. Many high schools have single police 
officers attached to them. Those officers are 
particularly vulnerable to this sort of attack 
because they work alone.
๏ The accused was trespassing  at the school for 
an unlawful purpose; to enforce his own 
concept of vigilante justice. This type of 
conduct is why there is a need for police at 
high schools.
๏ Assault causing  bodily harm is to a degree a 
consequence-based offence. The severity of the 
harm will normally be a relevant factor in 
sentencing. It would be expected that a football 
style kick to the head would normally result in 
substantial harm to its recipient. Such a kick 
has a real risk of causing  death with the 
potential of a second degree murder or 
manslaughter charge.
๏ Denunciation and deterrence are 
the prime considerations in 
sentencing  for this type of 
serious offence. This was a 
dangerous attack on a vulnerable 
police officer acting  in the 
course his duties.
The accused also suggested that the 
sentencing  judge did not consider a 
number of mitigating  factors which 
should have resulted in a lower sentence. But after 
review, the Court of Appeal found this argument was 
without merit. Some of the factors the court rejected 
as mitigating included:
➡ Motivation. Although the accused said he was 
concerned about his friend being  arrested, this 
motivation was ignoble. “Interfering  with a 
lawful arrest is not a form of motivation that 
weighs on the mitigating  side of the sentencing 
exercise,” said the Court. “It is also impossible 
to imagine any other positive motive in the 
circumstances of the [accused’s] attack on the 
vulnerable officer.“
➡ Role in the offence. The accused’s “role in 
the offence could not have been more singular. 
He alone kicked the officer in the head. He 
went to the school with an illicit purpose in 
mind and when the officer intervened, he took 
it upon himself to attack the officer.” 
➡ Post-offence behaviour. Sitting  quietly in the 
back of the police car after he was arrested was 
not mitigating. “By then he was in handcuffs 
and was doing  no more than what is expected 
of all arrested individuals. Raucous behaviour 
in a police cruiser may be aggravating, but 
compliance with societal norms is not 
mitigating.”
Finally, in rejecting  the accused’s argument that the 
judge ignored the step principle in fixing  an 
appropriate sentence, the Court of Appeal stated:
We do not see how that principle is at play in 
this case. The [accused] was being sentenced as 
a near first time offender. His prior 
record was essentially unrelated and 
was minimal. What occurred here is 
that a relatively young first time offender 
committed a serious, life threatening 
assault on a vulnerable police officer 
that left that officer with significant 
lasting consequences. First t ime 
offenders are often treated with leniency 
but some first offences can be so serious 
as to demand significant incarceration. 
This is such a case. [para. 26]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
“[I]nterfering with a 
lawful arrest is not a 
form of motivation 
that weighs on the 
mitigating side of the 
sentencing exercise.”  
“[H]e was a peace officer executing 
his duty. Many high schools have 
single police
officers attached to them. Those 
officers are particularly vulnerable to 
this sort of attack because they work 
alone.”  
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WATERFIELD TEST JUSTIFIES 
WARRANTLESS POLICE ENTRY
R. v. Farrah, 2011 MBCA 49                    
 
Two patrons using  an ATM located 
inside the front entrance of a bank at 
11:30 pm were confronted by a man 
with a sawed-off shotgun. The robber 
was wearing  a trench coat and a 
toque, and had a scarf over his face.  When the 
robber was distracted the two patrons fled. As one of 
the patrons was driving  away, the robber fired the 
shotgun at his vehicle. No one was injured but the 
vehicle was damaged. A few minutes later a police 
tracking  dog  was summoned to the scene. The dog 
picked up a scent, began tracking, and led police to 
an apartment building  about three blocks away.  A 
belt, commonly used to tie overcoats, was found 
inside the building. The dog  went to the second floor 
and initially showed interest in suite 16, but then 
proceeded to the front door of suite 12.  The K9 
officer noticed water on the floor in front of suite 16 
and saw that the door was ajar. The officer knew that 
a gun had been fired and considered that more than 
one person might be involved, so he ordered that 
both suites be secured in the interests of safety by 
clearing them of any persons. 
After police entered suite 12 with their guns drawn, 
the accused was found hiding  under a pile of 
clothing  in a bedroom.  He was handcuffed and 
escorted from the suite.  In suite 16 police found a 
sawed-off double-barreled shotgun in a kitchen 
closet, which was big  enough for a person to walk 
into and hide. One live round and one empty shell 
were found in the shotgun and it smelled of burnt 
gunpowder, as if it had recently been fired.  The 
officers also found, behind the main door to suite 
16, a trench coat without a belt, a pair of wet 
runners, two toques, and a scarf.  The belt found 
inside the building  appeared to match the trench 
coat found in the suite. The accused was arrested for 
robbery and weapons related offences and read his 
rights.  The police found keys for suites 12 and 16 
when they searched him and he told officers that he 
was in the process of moving  from suite 16 to suite 
12.
 
At trial in the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench the 
judge found the warrantless search of suite 16 was 
unreasonable and breached the accused’s s. 8 
Charter rights. She held that the police had acted 
without authority when they searched suite 16 
because the search was neither incidental to arrest 
nor detention, nor did the 911 call cases apply 
because the safety concerns in this case arose not in 
response to a 911 call, “but rather from the recent 
commission of a crime and the officers’ pursuit of 
one or more of the suspects”. In applying  the 
balancing  test in Waterfield/Dedman to determine 
whether there was a common law basis for the 
search, the judge stated:
While the search was clearly conducted in the 
execution of police duties, the issue is whether it 
involved a justifiable use of police powers in the 
circumstances.  That is, a balance must be struck 
between the competing interest of the police 
duty and the privacy of the individual.  In my 
view, the common law does not authorize the 
police to do what they did here.  That is, they 
were not justified in entering  a private dwelling 
house for a purpose connected with the arrest of 
a suspect or to apprehend a further suspect 
without the subjective belief that there were 
grounds for arrest.     
The judge found that the police had entered suite 16 
for a dual purpose. Not only did they enter to 
address public and police safety concerns, but also 
for a purpose connected to the accused’s pursuit and 
their intention to apprehend any other suspects. 
Because the police did not have the subjective belief 
that there were grounds for arrest when they entered 
the suite, their conduct was not justifiable under 
Waterfield/Dedman. Thus, the judge held that 
common law police powers did not authorize the 
officers to enter suite 16 without the subjective belief 
that there were grounds for an arrest. The evidence, 
however, was admitted under s.  24(2) and the 
accused was convicted of two counts of robbery 
with a firearm, possession of a prohibited weapon 
with ammunition, possession of a sawed-off shotgun 
for a dangerous purpose, disguise with intent, and 
mischief under $5,000. He was sentenced to seven 
years imprisonment, less pre-sentence custody 
credit.
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The accused then appealed to the Manitoba Court of 
Appeal arguing  that the trial judge erred in 
excluding  the evidence resulting  from the Charter 
violation. He also appealed his sentence.
The Entry 
In determining  whether there was a s. 8  Charter 
breach, all of the surrounding  circumstances would 
need to be considered. This determination involves a 
two-step process:
1) The accused must satisfy the court, on a 
balance of probabilities, that he had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect 
to suite 16. In this case the trial judge found the 
accused had established that he had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and the 
Court of Appeal accepted this finding.
2) If satisfied that an accused has established a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, a court will 
then inquire as to whether the search was 
reasonable.  “Normally, the onus falls on the 
accused to prove a Charter violation. However, 
because warrantless searches are presumptively 
unreasonable, it is the Crown that bears the 
burden of establishing, on a balance of 
probabilities, that the search was reasonable.  
The search will be reasonable if the police are 
authorized by law (either through statute or 
common law) to conduct the search, if the law 
authorizing  the search is reasonable and if the 
search is conducted in a reasonable manner.” 
Justice Chartier, writing  the Court of Appeal’s 
opinion, recognized that the “sources of legal 
authority for police to conduct warrantless searches 
will arise through statute or common law.” As for the 
common law, it will typically provide lawful 
authority for warrantless searches when:
✓ there is consent to the search;
✓ the police come upon evidence in the course of 
their duties or unexpectedly in plain view;
✓ the search is incident to arrest;
✓ the search is incident to detention; or
✓ the search is ancillary to the common law 
police powers and duties to keep the peace and 
preserve life (the Waterfield/Dedman test).
Side Bar
Can’t Cut It Both Ways
During a voir dire the accused did not 
testify. However, he nonetheless argued 
that his s.  8 Charter right had been 
breached when the police entered suite 16 
without a warrant.  To prove a breach of his 
s. 8 right, he attempted to establish that he 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
suite 16 by relying upon police testimony 
that he said he was still in the process of 
moving from suite 16 to suite 12. 
Later, however, the accused took the stand 
at trial and testified that, at the time of his 
arrest, he had no longer been living  at suite 
16 and that he had not been there for five 
days. He was distancing himself from the 
suite to avoid being found in possession of 
the gun. In essence, he was saying that he 
had no privacy interest in suite 16. This was 
contrary to the position he took during the 
voir dire.  Noting the evidence at the voir 
dire departed significantly from the 
evidence at trial, Justice Chartier stated:
[T]his contradiction is troublesome. The 
concern and unease are clear: an accused 
should not be able to successfully argue a 
position at a voir dire based upon evidence 
of, or from him, and then entirely disavow or 
attempt to disavow that position at trial based 
upon a change in his evidence.  Here, the 
position he took regarding a privacy interest 
at the voir dire allowed him to obtain a 
favourable Charter breach ruling.  How can 
he then be allowed to withdraw from his 
earlier position and argue that he had no 
privacy interest in suite 16 and thus cannot 
be linked to the shotgun found in that suite?  
The maxim quod approbo non reprobo 
comes to mind:  one cannot approbate and 
reprobate at the same time.
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Noting  that “an individual’s dwelling  house is 
deserving  of special protection from police 
intrusion,” Justice Chartier found that “any authority 
to perform the search conducted by the police 
would emanate from ... the ancillary police powers 
and duties to keep the public peace and preserve 
life, specifically to ensure public and police safety.” 
In determining  whether the entry and search 
amounted to a lawful exercise of their common law 
powers (and was therefore authorized by law), the 
two-pronged Waterfield/Dedman test had to be 
satisfied. The Crown needed to show that: 
(1) the search “fell within the general scope of the 
duties of a police officer under statute or 
common law”, and 
(2) the “interference with liberty [was] necessary 
for the carrying  out of the particular police duty 
and [was] reasonable, having  regard to the 
nature of the liberty interfered with and the 
importance of the public purpose served by the 
interference”.
Justice Chartier ruled that the trial judge “erred in 
law by conflating, in her ‘justifiability’ analysis, the 
common law police duty to ensure public and 
police safety with any ancillary action that may have 
been required following  the entry (arresting 
suspects)”:
In my opinion, whether the police believed they 
had grounds to arrest was not determinative of 
whether they were justified to enter the suite in 
the particular circumstances of this case.  What 
mattered was first, whether the police action (the 
warrantless entry into a dwelling) “fell within the 
general scope” of any duty imposed by law or 
recognized at common law and second, if it did, 
whether that action was in line, in the 
circumstances of this case, with the second 
prong of the Waterfield/Dedman test.
On the first part of the test (whether the search 
fell within the general scope of police duties), it 
is trite law that the common law powers of the 
police include the protection of life and 
property.  Any number of cases have also 
indicated that the police common law duties 
includes safety concerns.   ...   In this case, the 
principal duty to be performed, and the main 
reason for entry into suite 16, was to address 
public and police safety concerns.  As a result, 
the police entry to address such concerns would 
fall within the general scope of the common law 
duties of the police.
The second part of the test is whether the 
carrying out of that duty was “reasonable, 
having regard to the nature of the liberty 
interfered with and the importance of the public 
purpose served by the interference”. Put another 
way, was it a justifiable use of powers associated 
with the duty? [references omitted, paras. 37-39]
As well as the “‘justifiability’ factors, there must be 
an evidentiary basis underlying  the police safety 
concern,” said Justice Chartier. “The police must not 
be speculating  or acting  on a hunch. They must have 
reasonable grounds for the concern.”
In this case the Court of Appeal found the forced 
entry into the suite was a justifiable use of police 
powers to address public and officer safety 
concerns.  
[T]he information available to the police at the 
time of entry into suite 16 was that they were in 
“hot pursuit” of a suspect(s) involved in a 
robbery at a bank and that a gun had been 
discharged. They were aware that there was 
possibly more than one suspect. The tracking 
dog had led them first to suite 16 and then to 
suite 12. An unarmed suspect was found in suite 
12.  The gun had not yet been located.   Their 
attention returned to suite 16.  It must be 
remembered that a live round of ammunition 
had already been discharged in the direction of 
one of the complainants.  I  can easily conclude 
Waterfield/Dedman Justifiability Factors
The justifiability of an officer’s conduct depends on a 
number of factors including:
• the duty being performed, 
• the extent to which some interference with 
individual liberty is necessitated in order to 
perform that duty, 
• the importance of the performance of that duty to 
the public good, 
• the liberty interfered with, and 
• the nature and extent of the interference.
Volume 11 Issue 4 - July/August 2011
PAGE 9
that, on these facts, the police had reasonable 
grounds to be concerned for public and officer 
safety. 
Finally, it must be determined whether the 
forced entry into the dwelling to address public 
and officer safety concerns was justifiable 
considering the totality of the circumstances.  
The justifiability analysis is a contextual one 
and, for that reason, the circumstances of each 
case will inform the validity of the warrantless 
search.
Although the police had reasonable grounds for 
concern, they had no way of knowing, with 
certainty, who or what they would find upon 
entry into the suite. They were confronting an 
unpredictable and potentially volatile situation 
with a real possibility that the safety of the 
public or police officers may be imperilled if 
time were taken to obtain a warrant. Waiting  for 
a warrant was simply not a viable option. There 
may have been an injured party in that suite, a 
hostage may have been taken or an armed 
suspect may have suddenly exited the 
suite.  Immediate action was required to address 
these safety concerns.  There is considerable 
authority on the need for the police to act 
quickly when a gun is involved to address the 
risk posed to the community and the police. 
[references omitted, paras. 42-44]
 
Additionally, “where extraordinary 
circumstances exist (such as a 
legitimate cause for concern with 
respect to the safety of those at the 
scene or of the public generally), ... 
the police are permitted to enter the 
dwelling  without a warrant to 
conduct a ‘sweep search’ for other 
persons”:
A legal warrantless entry into a 
dwelling will often arise in an 
emergency setting, where it would 
be impractical to obtain a warrant 
because of the fluidity and potential 
volatility of the situation (in response to 911 
calls) or the dangerousness of the conditions (as 
in this case, where a shot had been fired and the 
police were in pursuit of the suspect). To be 
clear, because of the “high value” placed on the 
security and privacy of the home, situations 
calling for a warrantless non-consensual entry in 
a dwelling  will be the exception. [reference 
omitted, para. 47]
In this case, the trial judge was preoccupied with the 
apprehension of suspects (making  an arrest) as the 
purpose of police entry and their lack of a subjective 
belief that there were grounds to do so when they 
entered.  Instead, the principal reason for entry into 
suite 16 was to secure the premises as a result of 
public and officer safety concerns, not to make 
arrests. Even though the police did make an arrest, it 
was ancillary to safety reasons for entry. 
The Waterfield/Dedman test had been met and the 
entry into and the search of suite 16 was authorized 
by law.  The manner in which the search was 
conducted was also reasonable. It was limited to 
what was necessary to meet the ends - clearing  the 
premises of any immediate threat inside:
The police entered the suite and conducted ... a 
search “proportionate to [the] concern” ... The 
purpose of the entry and search was to 
clear the suite of any persons who may 
cause harm. In such circumstances, it is 
reasonable to limit the interference with 
the person’s privacy to a search of any 
part of the suite which might provide a 
space for a person to hide.  It is 
uncontested that that is what occurred 
here. One of the places searched was a 
closet which was large enough to hide a 
person.  That is where they found the 
gun.  In my view, the search that 
occurred here was, in all of the 
c i rcums tances , conduc ted in a 
reasonable manner. [para. 51]
“[T]here must be an 
evidentiary basis 
underlying the police 
safety concern. The 
police must not be 
speculating or acting 
on a hunch.  They 
must have 
reasonable grounds 
for the concern.”  
“A legal warrantless entry into a dwelling will often arise in an emergency setting, where it 
would be impractical to obtain a warrant because of the fluidity and potential volatility of 
the situation ... or the dangerousness of the conditions”  
Volume 11 Issue 4 - July/August 2011
PAGE 10
The accused’s s. 8 rights were not violated. And, 
even if the Charter  was breached, the evidence was 
nonetheless admissible. “Although the expectation 
of privacy in one’s dwelling  is prima facie high, the 
fact that a Charter breach occurred in such a setting 
does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that the 
admis s ion o f ev idence would b r ing  the 
administration of justice into disrepute,” said Justice 
Chartier. He then went applied the three s. 24(2) 
lines of inquiry to the trial judge’s analysis:
• the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state 
conduct. The search of suite 16 was an attempt 
by the police to ensure public and officer safety 
and they acted in good faith. Their conduct was 
driven by real, immediate, and understandable 
safety concerns. It was not the kind of action a 
court needed to distance itself from in order to 
protect the integrity of the justice system.
• the impact of the breach on the Charter-
protected interests of the accused. The search 
was proportionate to the safety concern. It was 
limited and focussed and not particularly 
invasive. The suite was almost bare because the 
accused had essentially completed his move 
from suite 16 to suite 12. Nor was he accused’s 
dignity compromised when suite  16 was 
cleared.
• society’s interest in adjudication on the merits. 
The gun was reliable evidence and was vital to 
the Crown’s case. The exclusion of it would 
have a greater negative effect on the repute of 
the administration of justice than would its 
inclusion.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
CHARTER VIOLATIONS CAN’T BE 
LOANED
R. v. Schmidt, 2011 ABCA 216 
A drug  user rented a one-room 
apartment in a building  known to the 
police for violence, drug  trafficking, 
and gang  member activity. He asked 
an area patrol officer for assistance in 
removing  unwanted guests staying  at and taking  over 
his suite. The officer said he would stop by, knock, 
and make sure everything  was okay. The first time 
the officer checked two unwanted guests were found 
sleeping  in the man’s bed. They were ejected and 
banned from the building  due to their gang 
affiliation and their history of violence, drug  use, 
and trafficking. A sawed off rifle was also removed 
from the residence. The drug  user told police he did 
not have the courage to tell unwanted guests to 
leave and feared that he would suffer physical 
violence if he tried to eject them or bar them from 
entering. He also feared that he would suffer 
physical violence if word got out that he was 
cooperating  with the police or asking  for their 
assistance. As a result of those concerns, a safe word 
was agreed upon for future conversations that would 
indicate the man felt safe to speak openly with 
police. 
On a subsequent occasion police performed a 
routine patrol of the apartment building  and stopped 
at the man’s suite. When they knocked on the door, 
the man opened it and, when prompted, replied that 
“friends” of his were in the suite. He then backed 
away from the door and waved his arm which the 
officers took as an indication for them to enter. That 
gesture was understood to mean that there were 
unwanted people in the suite. Because the man did 
not use the safe word, police were concerned that 
these “friends” were unwanted gang  members, drug 
users, or drug  dealers. The suite was fairly dark and 
there were four other people in it, including  the 
accused who was sitting  semi-conscious on a bench. 
Clothing  and bags were strewn about the apartment 
and there was drug  paraphernalia on a table. The 
officer approached the accused to identify him and 
saw his hand on the handle of a steak knife that was 
resting  on a bench. The knife was pointing  towards 
The s. 24 (2) analysis (Grant test) requires the 
court to consider:
(1) the seriousness of the Charter breach,
(2) the impact of that breach on the accusedʼs 
Charter-protected rights, and 
(3) the societal interest in having criminal matters 
adjudicated on their merits.
see R. v. Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353
Volume 11 Issue 4 - July/August 2011
PAGE 11
the officer. The officer was concerned about the 
situation escalating  into a lethal force encounter 
because of the accused’s state and the fact that 
police were outnumbered 5 to 2 in the small 
confined space of the suite. He grabbed the 
accused, pulled him away from the knife, and 
pushed him up against the fridge, arresting  him for 
possessing  a weapon. The accused was patted down 
and an object was felt in his pocket. The officer 
pushed the object up and determined that it was a 
shotgun shell. Two to three feet from where the 
accused had been seated was a black gym bag  lying 
open on the floor. Using  a flashlight to see inside 
and pushing  the flaps apart a little bit, the officer 
observed a sawed off shotgun (a prohibited firearm). 
It was not loaded, but a shotgun shell was found in 
the kitchen area which matched the brand and 
calibre of the one found in the accused’s pocket. 
These shells could be discharged from the sawed-off 
shotgun. The accused was also bound by an order 
prohibiting  him from possessing  any firearms or 
ammunition. 
An Alberta Provincial Court 
judge found that police had 
consent to enter the apartment 
and he did not believe the 
tenant’s testimony that the 
officers were not invited in on 
the day in question. As well, the judge concluded 
that the accused did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the apartment in any event. 
Moreover, the judge held that the pat-down search 
upon arrest was reasonable because it was done for 
officer safety reasons as a direct result of observing 
the accused holding  a steak knife. No Charter 
breaches were found. The black bag  was in plain 
view. It was close to where the accused was sitting 
and a shotgun shell was found in his pocket. The 
only rational conclusion was that the accused was 
aware that the shotgun was in the black bag  and that 
he had knowledge and possession of it. The accused 
was convicted of possessing  a prohibited firearm 
with ammunition and two counts of possessing  a 
firearm/ammunition contrary to a prohibition order. 
The accused then challenged his conviction to the 
Alberta Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that the trial 
judge erred in finding  that there was sufficient 
evidence of consent to search the suite and in 
finding  that there were grounds to detain and search 
him. But these arguments were rejected.
Consent
The Court of Appeal concluded there was sufficient 
evidence for the trial judge to determine that the 
police had consent to enter and search the 
apartment. The trial judge disbelieved the evidence 
given by the tenant. Furthermore, “even if the police 
officers did not have the consent of the tenant to 
enter and search his apartment, their conclusion that 
they had his consent was reasonable and means that 
they acted in good faith in searching,” said the 
Court. This would have been a significant factor in 
admitting  the evidence under s. 24(2) has a 
constitutional violation been found. As well, “a 
Charter breach is not something  that can be loaned 
by one citizen to another. If the police were wrong 
in their understanding  that they had consent to 
search the apartment, that might have been a 
Charter breach vis-à-vis the tenant,” 
said the Court. “That breach of the 
tenant’s right does not protect the 
[accused].” 
The Pat-Down Search
As for the pat-down search, which resulted in the 
discovery of the shotgun shell, it was lawful either as 
a search incident to arrest or incident to investigative 
detention:
The search was conducted after the officer 
observed the [accused] either in a state of sleep 
or near sleep, or of extreme intoxication, with a 
knife under his hand. The scenario included 
what can only be described as a dark drug  den 
with several people in a small confined space, 
all apparently in a stupor of some sort. 
The officer believed that the purpose of the knife 
involved danger to the police or the others in the 
apartment. Although the [accused] was not 
convicted of the charge that flowed from his 
having  the knife, the standards required for an 
arrest and a conviction are substantially 
different. The officer had the requisite grounds to 
make an arrest; search of the person incident to 
“A Charter breach is not 
something that can be 
loaned by one citizen to 
another.”  
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arrest does not result in a Charter breach. In R. v. 
Mann ... the Supreme Court held that police 
officers who have reasonable grounds to suspect 
that an individual is connected to a particular 
crime may detain the individual for investigative 
purposes, and may also conduct a pat-down 
search of the individual for the purposes of 
officer safety and the safety of others. That is 
exactly what the police did here. ... [paras. 
21-22]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
DEMONSTRATING FORFEITURE’s 
DISPROPORTIONALITY RESTS 
ON OFFENDER 
R. v. Trieu, 2011 BCCA 303
The police obtained a search warrant 
for the accused’s home and found 
492 marihuana plants in two 
separate rooms. There was evidence 
the home was lived in and the 
accused was the sole owner of it. He had bought the 
house in 2001 for $303,000, of which $193,000 was 
secured by a mortgage. The most recent property 
assessment valued the home at $665,000. At trial the 
accused denied that the marihuana grow operation 
was his and that, unknown to him, it was the work 
of tenants renting  the house. A British Columbia 
Provincial Court judge did not believe the accused’s 
testimony, concluded that the operation belonged to 
him, and entered convictions for unlawfully 
producing  marihuana and possessing  marihuana for 
the purpose of trafficking. The judge considered the 
size of the marihuana grow operation, its 
profitability, the absence of any criminal record, and 
the absence of any evidence that a criminal 
organization was involved. He found that the impact 
of a forfeiture order on the home was not 
disproportionate to the factors mentioned in s. 
19.1(3) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 
(CDSA) and ordered the accused’s entire house 
forfeited to the Crown. A 12 month conditional 
sentence was also imposed, as was a weapons 
prohibition and an order for DNA sampling. He then 
THE GROW-OP
• medium size grow operation of low to 
moderate sophistication;
• 281 vegetative marihuana plants found in a 
downstairs room, all about 20” tall. The 
room was equipped with high intensity 
lights and fans;
• high intensity lights and 211 small 
marihuana “clones” or cuttings found in 
another downstairs room, all about 1 1/2 “ 
tall;
• many used plant pots with dried soil in them 
found in another downstairs room;
• another room had been equipped to grow 
marihuana but no plants were found there;
• the exhaust system of the house furnace had 
been disconnected;
•  21 new high intensity lights, one with the 
accused’s fingerprints on it, were found in a 
box on the landing of the basement stairs;
• two drying marihuana plants were hanging 
upside down in the closet of an upstairs 
bedrooms. There was also oscillating fan 
and a quantity of flexible venting in the 
closet; 
• more light bulbs along with a boxed fan 
were in another bedroom; 
• more high intensity light bulbs along with 
the clear plastic tops for the flats in which 
the clones are grown were in an upper floor 
hallway closet; 
• there was evidence of tampering with the 
electrical system of the house and there 
were holes for various attempts at 
ventilation throughout the house; and
• the assessed value of actual crop $123,500 
while the potential annual yield between 
$250,000 up to $616,000.
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challenged the forfeiture order to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal arguing  its impact was 
disproportionate and that the judge erred in failing 
to consider partial forfeiture of the property.
Section 19.1(3) of the CDSA requires a forfeiture 
order not be “disproportionate” having  regard to the 
nature and gravity of the offence, the circumstances 
surrounding  its commission, and the criminal 
record, if any, of the offender. The burden for 
demonstrating  that an order of forfeiture is 
disproportionate, whether full or partial, rests on the 
offender. Here, the accused contended, in part, that 
a complete forfeiture order was disproportionate and 
should be set aside, emphasizing  that he was an 
immigrant and hardworking  family man with no 
criminal record. The Crown, on the other hand, 
submitted that the forfeiture order was not 
disproportionate and the statutory factors set out in 
s. 19.1(3) were a complete code. In its view, the 
circumstances of the offender, other than his 
criminal record, were not to be considered in the 
proportionality analysis. 
The Court of Appeal found the sentencing  judge 
properly considered the factors set out in s. 19.1(3). 
In agreeing  that the order for complete forfeiture was 
not disproportionate, taking  into account all of the 
circumstances, Chief Justice Finch stated:
The [accused] does not have a criminal record 
and there is no evidence of any links to 
organized crime. However, this was a 
commercial grow operation in an urban setting. 
The profits from the operation were significant. 
The property was al tered in order to 
accommodate the grow operation, including 
evidence of tampering with the electrical system. 
The risk of danger from fire and drug-related 
violence was always present. [at para. 19]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Note-able Quote
”The right to do something does not mean that 
doing it is right.” - William Safire
DEMAND VALID EVEN THOUGH 
ASD NOT AVAILABLE 
FORTHWITH
R. v. Degiorgio, 2011 ONCA 527
Police received information that 
someone was slumped over the 
steering  wheel of a vehicle stopped 
in front of a driveway. Its lights were 
on and its motor was running. The 
attending  police officer approached the vehicle and 
observed that the window was down. The accused 
was sitting  in the driver’s seat. She was alert, her 
eyes were glassy, and there was a strong  odour of 
alcoholic beverage coming  from the area of her 
mouth. She denied consuming  alcohol that day and 
said she was tired, having  come from her friend’s 
house. She also seemed confused about her 
whereabouts. The officer concluded that there were 
reasonable grounds to suspect that she had alcohol 
in her body and he made a demand under s. 254(2) 
of the Criminal Code (CC) for a sample of her breath 
into an ASD, even though he did not have one with 
him. The accused responded, “I am not blowing  into 
anything”.  After requesting  she step out of the 
vehicle, the officer asked her if she understood the 
demand. She said, “Yes, I’m not blowing  into 
anything”. The officer told the accused that refusing 
to comply with the demand was a criminal charge 
with the same penalty as impaired driving  or driving 
over the legal limit and that it would result in an 
automatic 90-day driver’s license suspension.  He 
made it very clear that she was legally required to 
provide a breath sample. The officer re-read the 
demand and asked the accused if she understood. 
Again she responded, “Yes, but I’m not blowing  into 
anything.” She was arrested for refusing  to provide a 
sample into an ASD, advised of her right to counsel, 
and subsequently released on an appearance notice, 
departing  in a taxi. She was charged with refusing  to 
provide a breath sample under s. 254(5).
The Ontario Court of Justice found that the accused 
did not have a “reasonable excuse” for not 
complying  with the demand and she was convicted 
of refusing  to provide a breath sample, even though 
no ASD was available at the scene.  
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On appeal to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, 
the accused argued that the ASD demand was 
invalid as it did not comply with s. 254(2).  She 
argued that she was under no legal obligation to 
provide a breath sample because there was no 
evidence that the officer was in a position to 
administer the test “forthwith” since he did not have 
access to an ASD.  The appeal judge disagreed and 
held that the offence was complete when the 
accused refused to comply with the demand. “[T]he 
offence is complete once the demand, which 
conforms with the conditions in s. 254(2) - 
reasonable grounds to suspect that a person has 
alcohol or drugs in their body and has operated a 
motor vehicle or had its care or control within the 
preceding  three hours - is not complied with,” said 
the appeal judge. “If an accused agreed to provide a 
sample and one is not taken ‘forthwith’, the sample 
cannot be used in evidence. To require the Crown to 
prove that a sample can be taken forthwith 
whenever an accused has refused to provide a 
sample engages a theoretical exercise; whereas, if 
the accused complies with the demand and a 
sample is not taken forthwith, the Court adjudicates 
the actual facts.”
The accused further appealed, this time to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal. She again contended that 
the “forthwith” requirement mandated by s. 254(2) 
did apply to an outright refusal. In her view, a 
demand was only valid if the police were in a 
position to administer the ASD test forthwith.  She 
suggested that the forthwith requirement in s. 254(2) 
imposed a duty on the police to be in a position to 
administer the test, even in the face of a refusal. If 
they were not, then the demand was not valid. She 
submitted that if the demand was not valid under 
254(2), she could not be convicted under s. 254(5). 
s. 254 of the Criminal Code
Justice Laforme, writing  the Court of Appeal’s 
opinion, first considered s. 254 as a whole:
• Parliament created a two-step detection and 
enforcement procedure that necessarily 
interferes with rights and freedoms guaranteed 
by the Charter, but only in a manner that is 
reasonably necessary to protect the public’s 
interest in keeping  impaired drivers off the 
road. 
• s. 254(2)(b) authorizes peace officers, on 
reasonable suspicion of alcohol consumption, 
to require drivers to provide breath samples for 
testing  on an ASD. These screening  tests, at or 
near the roadside, determine whether more 
conclusive testing is warranted. 
• s. 254(3) allows peace officers having  the 
requisite reasonable and probable grounds to 
demand breath samples for a more conclusive 
breathalyzer analysis.  
• Breathalyzers determine precisely the alcohol 
concentration in a person’s blood and thus 
permit peace officers to ascertain whether the 
alcohol level of the detained driver exceeds the 
legal limit. Breathalyzer results can provide the 
police with evidence to charge the motorist 
with driving  offences such as s. 253(b) – over 
80mg%.
• The admissibility of breathalyzer results can 
depend on whether the police had the requisite 
grounds to make the demand.  Sometimes the 
only evidence  of reasonable and probable 
grounds for the breathalyzer demand is the 
ASD results obtained by the police. 
• There are two ways in which an ASD breath 
sample can be legally obtained: (i) by way of a 
valid demand under s. 254(2 or (ii) voluntarily.  
• s. 254(5) provides that “[e]veryone commits an 
offence who, without reasonable excuse, fails 
or refuses to comply with a demand made 
under this section.” 
• “Forthwith” means “immediately” or “without 
delay”. The “forthwith” requirement in s. 254(2) 
allows for its constitutional integrity. If it were 
not for the immediacy requirement, s. 254(2) 
would violate ss. 8, 9 and 10 of the Charter. 
The demand that was given: I demand 
that you provide a suitable sample of 
your breath directly into an approved 
screening  device forthwith to enable a 
proper analysis of your breath to be 
made and that you accompany me for 
the purpose of enabling a sample to be 
taken.  Do you understand?
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The “forthwith” requirement is a corollary of 
the fact that there is no opportunity for contact 
with counsel prior to compliance with the ASD 
demand.  Both the police demand and the 
driver’s response must be “forthwith” or 
immediate; the requirement is for “a prompt 
demand by the peace officer, and an immediate 
response by the person to whom that demand is 
addressed”
In rejecting  the accused’s argument that an ASD 
must be available “forthwith” in order for a demand 
to be valid, Justice Laforme found that neither the 
text of ss. 254(2) or (5) or the cases that have 
considered these provisions supported this view:
The meaning  to be given to s. 254(5) must be 
informed by i t s purpose.  The sect ion 
criminalizes a refusal to provide potentially 
incriminating evidence. In doing so, it provides 
the police with a powerful tool in their efforts to 
curtail, investigate and prosecute drinking and 
driving  related offences. The deaths and 
substantial societal costs associated with 
drinking  and driving fully justify the existence of 
this extraordinary criminal offence.   
The conduct criminalized by s. 254(2) consists of 
a proper s. 254(2) demand and an unequivocal 
refusal to comply with that demand. The offence 
is completed when the refusal is given. There is 
nothing  in the language of s. 254(2) that would 
require the Crown to prove that had the driver 
not refused to provide the sample, the 
demanding police officer could have complied 
with his or her obligation to take the sample 
“forthwith”.  Nor can I understand why, as a 
matter of criminal law policy, a driver who has 
unequivocally refused to forthwith provide a 
breath sample should escape criminal 
responsibility for that refusal based on events 
subsequent and totally unrelated to the refusal.  
How is the culpability of the person who refuses 
to comply with a demand reduced because, as 
events may have developed, the officer may not 
have been able to take the sample forthwith?
s.254 - a two-step detection & enforcement procedure
Step One Step Two
Demand section s. 254 (2) s. 254 (3)
Test type screening test conclusive test
Triggering threshold reasonable suspicion reasonable grounds to believe
Means of testing approved screening device (ASD) approved instrument (breathalyzer)
Purpose to determine whether more conclusive testing is 
warranted
to determine precisely the alcohol concentration in a person’s 
blood
Evidentiary value ASD results can provide the reasonable 
grounds needed for the breathalyzer demand
can provide the evidence to charge the motorist with s. 
253(b) – over 80 mg%
s. 10 (b) Charter suspended if sample taken forthwith informational and implementational components applicable
BY THE BOOK:
ASD Demand: Criminal Code
s.  254(2)(b) If a peace officer has reasonable 
grounds to suspect that a person has alcohol ... 
in their body and that the person has, within 
the preceding  three hours,  operated a motor 
vehicle ... the police officer may, by demand, require the 
person... (b) to provide forthwith a sample of breath that, in 
the peace officer’s opinion, will enable a proper analysis to 
be made by means of an approved  screening  device and,  if 
necessary, to accompany the peace officer for that purpose.
.........
s.  254(5) Everyone commits an offence who, without 
reasonable  excuse, fails  or refuses to comply with the 
demand made under this section.
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I read the text itself of s. 254(5) as requiring  the 
Crown to prove the following constituent 
elements of the offence:
1. The preconditions set out in s. 254(2);  
2. A demand that the individual “provide 
forthwith a sample of breath”;
3. The individual of whom the demand was 
made understood the demand;
4. The individual refused to comply with that 
demand; and
5. The individual did not have a reasonable 
excuse for failing to comply with the demand. 
[reference omitted, paras. 41-43]
“Forthwith”
Justice Laforme also considered a number of points 
in determining  whether the demand was valid only if 
the officer was in a position to administer the test 
forthwith: 
• The “forthwith” period is the time 
in which Charter rights are 
justifiably infringed, i.e. the time 
in which a detained person can be 
required to comply with an ASD 
demand and the time in which a 
person’s response to that demand 
– be it blowing  and registering  a 
Fail, or be it refusing  or failing  to 
blow – can incur criminal liability 
that is unaffected by the Charter.
• What would otherwise be an 
impermissible violation of Charter 
rights is rendered justifiable 
because of the “ for thwith” 
requirement.  
• The question to be decided is 
whether the police were in a 
position to receive into an ASD 
the breath sample the suspect was 
prepared to provide – or had not 
refused to provide – during  the 
period of time that no realistic 
opportunity to consult counsel 
existed, i.e. “forthwith”.
• The right to counsel is triggered upon detention 
at the roadside.  That right is, however, 
effectively suspended by operation of s. 1 of the 
Charter for the time period captured by the 
requirement that the sample be taken 
“forthwith”.  If the demand is made and the 
sample provided within the forthwith window 
of time, the Charter is not breached.  If, 
however, the forthwith window expires, then 
the taking  of a sample without first providing 
the detainee an opportunity to contact counsel 
is an infringement of s. 10(b) that cannot be 
saved by s. 1.
• If the demand is otherwise proper and the 
outright refusal occurs during  the “forthwith” 
timeframe (as in this case), the accused’s 10(b) 
rights are not engaged and cannot affect the 
accused’s liability under s. 254(5).  If, however, 
the refusal is made outside of the “forthwith” 
timeframe it will engage Charter rights such as 
when a refusal does not immediately follow the 
demand but instead the driver refuses only 
when presented with the ASD.  
The Court of Appeal found the Crown 
does not have to prove that the sample 
could in fact have been taken in 
accordance with the provisions of the 
Criminal Code to secure a conviction 
on a charge of refusing  to comply with 
the demand. “There is no requirement 
that a police officer have a reasonable 
belief that he or she could ‘make the 
demand good’ at the time it is made,” 
said Justice Laforme. “[N]either is there 
a requirement for the Crown to prove 
that the police could have made the 
demand good (i.e. that an ASD would 
have been available) within the 
“forthwith” period.  Such a requirement 
is not apparent from the text or purpose 
of the provision; neither can it be 
necessitated by Charter  considerations, 
because during  the ‘forthwith’ period 
any such considerations are validly 
suspended under s. 1.” A police officer’s 
ability to actually take the sample in 
accordance with the demand is not 
relevant to culpability on a charge of refusing  to 
provide the sample:
“There is no 
requirement that a 
police officer have a 
reasonable belief 
that he or she could 
‘make the demand 
good’ at the time it is 
made.... [N]either is 
there a requirement 
for the Crown to 
prove that the police 
could have made the 
demand good (i.e. 
that an ASD would 
have been available) 
within the ‘forthwith’ 
period.”  
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The offence created by s. 254(2) is complete 
upon the refusal. In the face of such a refusal, 
the police are not obliged to carry on as if there 
had been no refusal and the court is not obliged 
to speculate as to what might have happened 
had the police officer carried on.   The offence is 
complete upon proof that the preconditions to 
the demand in s. 254(2) existed, the officer 
demanded a sample “forthwith”, and the 
[accused] unequivocally refused, without any 
r e a s o n a b l e e x c u s e , t o p r o v i d e t h a t 
sample. [para. 65]
And further:
[T]here are two scenarios that are contemplated 
involving  ss. 254(2) and (5).  The first is a 
demand and the legitimacy of the process 
thereafter of the motorist’s providing  self-
incriminating evidence of an offence; the second 
is a demand and a refusal or failure to comply. 
In the first scenario, both the police demand and 
the driver’s compliance must be accomplished 
“forthwith” or immediately.  That is to say, the 
police officer must be able to receive the breath 
sample, which the person has agreed to provide 
or has not refused to provide, before there is any 
realistic opportunity for the detained person to 
consult counsel. 
In the second scenario, where there has been an 
outright refusal to provide a breath sample, the 
offence is made out if the demand was properly 
made.  The Crown is not required to establish 
that the ASD was present at the scene, or that it 
could have been present at the scene within the 
“forthwith” period. [paras. 67-69]
In this case, the accused immediately and 
unequivocally refused on three occasions to provide 
the sample despite being  told of the potential penal 
consequences. She clearly understood that she was 
required to provide the sample then and there. The 
police did not have to continue with the process of 
locating  or deploying  an ASD at the scene. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed and her conviction 
for refusing to provide a breath sample was upheld. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
POLICE ACTION A DYNAMIC 
PROCESS: NOT TO BE OVER 
ANALYZED BY PARSING EVENTS 
INTO STATIC MOMENTS
R. v. Amofa, 2011 ONCA 368 
Two plain clothed police officers 
were on duty to observe and 
investigate people loitering  in the 
Toronto Transit Commission’s (TTC) 
Warden subway station as part of a 
broader police initiative, the Robbery Reduction 
Program. This program was in response to a number 
of recent swarming  incidents in subway stations 
involving  groups of youths surrounding, threatening 
and/or assaulting  victims, and forcing  them to give 
up possessions.  The Warden TTC station was 
identified by police as a high risk area for crime. 
There had been robberies and shootings in the 
past.  The two officers observed the accused and 
another young  man at the top of the stairs leading 
down to a bus bay at the station. They were blocking 
the flow of passengers walking  from the mezzanine 
to the bus platform. At the same time they appeared 
to be making  no effort to board a bus; two buses 
came and went during  the period of police 
observation. The officers formed the opinion that the 
two men were loitering. After about 20 minutes the 
men left the stairs and entered a small “to go” 
bakery on the mezzanine level.  One at a time, 
taking  turns, they would leave the bakery, look 
around outside, and then return. Police thought that 
the two men were looking  for particular people and 
were concerned that their conduct might be leading 
towards something  serious, such as a robbery, 
mugging, or something similar.
The two officers approached the accused and the 
other man in the bakery, identified themselves as 
police, and told them they were being  investigated 
Footnote Word of Caution: The Ontario Court of 
Appeal noted that an officer making a demand but 
never intending to actually take a sample, instead 
hoping that the driver would refuse so that the driver 
could be charged with refusing to provide a sample, 
would raise significant abuse of process concerns. 
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under Ontario’s Trespass to Property Act (TPA) for 
loitering  on TTC property. They cooperated by 
identifying  themselves and producing  valid drivers’ 
licences. An officer wanted to conduct a “pat down” 
search for safety reasons. The accused was advised 
that he was being  investigated for an arrestable 
offence. He was told that he was not under arrest, 
but that the officer would like to search him.  The 
accused responded by saying, “No, I’ll search 
myself.” He pulled some harmless objects out of his 
pockets and returned his hands to them, refusing  to 
put his hands out where they could be seen. He said 
he did not want to be searched because he had not 
done anything. As he was speaking, the accused did 
not face the officer directly. Instead, he “bladed” his 
body - police jargon for hiding  or obscuring 
something. The accused was then arrested for 
trespassing. He resisted and attempted to escape, but 
was prevented from doing  so and a violent struggle 
ensued. After backup arrived the accused was 
subdued, searched, and a loaded .45 calibre semi-
automatic handgun was found in the waistband of 
his pants.   
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the judge 
found that the two men were detained while being 
questioned. However, the detention was not 
arbitrary because the police had a reasonable belief 
that the men were loitering  and they were entitled to 
question them.  The search was lawful and the 
accused was convicted of possessing  a loaded, 
unauthorized, and restricted firearm under s. 95(1) 
of the Criminal Code.
 
The accused appealed his conviction to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal arguing  his Charter  rights were 
violated in the course of the investigative detention 
and arrest, and that the trial judge erred in failing  to 
exclude the firearm under s. 24(2) of the Charter. He 
suggested that the police conducted an arrest 
incidental to a search rather than a search incidental 
to arrest. In his view, the Robbery Reduction 
Program was illegal because it formed part of an 
overall police strategy that amounted to monitoring 
sites for suspicious-looking  people and invoking  the 
power to investigate and arrest under provincial 
trespass legislation as a pretext to search them.  He 
submitted that the search of the accused was not 
truly incidental to his arrest nor to an investigative 
detention.  Instead, he contended that the arrest was 
incidental to the search and therefore the search was 
illegal. The Ontario Court of Appeal, however, 
rejected these arguments:
1. “There was nothing  arbitrary or improper in the 
police surveillance of the subway station or in 
the arrest,” said Justice Blair, speaking  for the 
unanimous Appeal Court. He continued: 
The Robbery Reduction Program was well 
within the scope of the duty of the police to 
protect the public. I see nothing inherently 
objectionable in the police monitoring the 
subway station for suspicious-looking 
people – given the history of criminal 
incidents there, at any rate – and invoking 
the power to investigate and arrest under 
provincial trespass legislation were the 
factual circumstances existed to underpin 
such action, as they did here. The power to 
investigate and arrest under provincial 
trespass legislation is not being  abused, or 
used as a pretext, where the police have the 
necessary grounds in the circumstances to 
resort to them. [para. 15]
2. The officers had more than ample grounds to 
investigate, detain, and arrest the accused for 
loitering under the TPA: 
The flow of the investigative detention, the 
arrest and the search was a dynamic 
process. Section 8  analyses ought not to be 
reduced to an over-analytical parsing  of 
events into static moments without practical 
regard for the overall picture. 
[The officer] had reasonable and probable 
grounds to arrest the [accused] when he ... 
first approached the two men, but exercised 
restraint instead and chose not to do 
so. Although [the accused’s lawyer] submits 
that the power to search incidental to arrest 
is not automatically triggered by arrest, he 
conceded that if [the officer] had arrested 
the [accused] at this time he could have 
performed a non-intrusive pat-down search 
of the [accused].  In my view, the fact that 
the [accused] remained under investigative 
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detention at that point in time did not alter 
this prerogative. [paras. 19-20]
And further:
The officers were properly safety-
cautious in the circumstances.  They 
were rightly concerned about the 
prospect of potential danger, given 
the underpinnings of the Robbery 
Reduction Program itself, the history 
of violence at that particular subway 
station, and their observations of the 
two men on the stairway and at the 
bakery. [The officer] therefore had 
“reasonable grounds to believe that 
his ... safety or that of others [was] at 
risk” in the circumstances and he 
would have been justif ied in 
conducting a pat-down search at the point 
of investigative detention.
But he did not conduct a physical search at 
that time. Instead, the situation continued to 
evolve. 
There is a continuum of conduct to 
consider here.  It started with the officer’s 
telling  the [accused] that the officer was 
going to search him.  It then continued 
through the [accused’s] efforts to avoid a 
search by the officer, the arrest, the 
attempted escape and the ultimate retrieval 
of the weapon – all as outlined in more 
detail above.
In my opinion, [the officer] had reasonable 
grounds to arrest the [accused] when he 
first told the [accused] that he was being 
investigated for an arrestable offence but 
was not then being  arrested, and the actual 
arrest that occurred a few moments 
later.  Thus, the grounds to arrest for 
trespassing  continued to exist.  The arrest 
was lawful and the circumstances outlined 
above amply justified a search incidental to 
that arrest – even if one assumes (as I do 
not) that there were not sufficient grounds 
to conduct a search incidental to the 
original investigative detention.  Whether 
the “search” consisted of the physical pat-
down exercise itself, or whether it consisted 
of the continuum of conduct from the time 
[the officer] told the [accused] he “was 
going to search him” until the physical 
search was completed, is of l i t t le 
significance.  The search 
was justified on either 
interpretation in the 
circumstances.  [paras. 
23-26]
The search process was 
lawful and did not violate 
the accused’s s. 8 rights. 
However, even if there was 
a s. 8  violation, it was of a 
very minor nature, the 
breach was slight, and the 
evidence was nonetheless 
admissible under s. 24(2). 
If the grounds to conduct a search were insufficient, 
they were not missing  by much. The loaded firearm 
was real evidence and was essential to the Crown’s 
case.  The circumstances as a whole strongly 
favoured inclusion of the evidence. The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Note-able Quote
“If you have integrity, nothing else matters.  If you 
don't have integrity, nothing else matters.” - Alan 
Simpson
“The flow of the investigative 
detention, the arrest and the 
search was a dynamic 
process. Section 8 analyses 
ought not to be reduced to 
an over-analytical parsing of 
events into static moments 
without practical regard for 
the overall picture.”  
BY THE BOOK:
Power of Arrest: Ontario’s TPA
Arrest without warrant on premises
s.  9(1)  A police officer, or the occupier of 
premises, or a person authorized  by the 
occupier may arrest without warrant any 
person he or she believes on reasonable 
and probable grounds to be on the premises in 
contravention of section 2.
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DOCTRINE OF SEVERABILITY 
SAVES WIRETAP 
AUTHORIZATION
R. v. Ahmed, 2011 BCCA 254
Agents designated by the Attorney 
General of British Columbia and the 
Solicitor General of Canada jointly 
made an application for a wiretap 
authorization under s. 186 of the 
Criminal Code in relation to the investigation of 
firearm and drug  related offences. The authorization 
permit ted the police to intercept private 
communications at various places, including  cellular 
telephone calls. The primary targets of the 
authorization were the accused and three other 
men, two from Pakistan. The firearms offences 
involved efforts to acquire a large cache of 
automatic weapons while the drug-related offences 
involved the ongoing  importation and distribution of 
heroin.
In British Columbia Supreme Court the accused 
accepted that the sworn affidavit filed in support of 
the authorization satisfied the reasonable grounds 
requirement for the drug-related offences. But he 
suggested that it failed to satisfy the reasonable 
grounds requirement for the firearms offences. The 
judge rejected this argument and upheld the 
authorization, finding  the police had met the 
reasonable grounds requirement for both the drug 
and firearms offences. 
The accused renewed his objection to the validity of 
the authorization before the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal and sought an order quashing  his 
convictions and directing  acquittals, or at least a 
new trial. The Court of Appeal, however, did not find 
it necessary to decide whether the authorization was 
properly issued with respect to the firearms offences 
because the doctrine of severability applied:        
In the case at bar, there were, in effect, two 
separate authorizations granted within one 
formal order: one at the request of the Attorney 
General of British Columbia to assist in the 
investigation of firearms offences; the other at 
the request of the Solicitor General of Canada to 
assist in the investigation of drug-related 
offences. The terms of those two authorizations 
are identical in all respects, e.g., who could be 
intercepted and where those interceptions could 
be made. Accordingly, as long  as there was a 
basis for granting one of those authorizations, 
interceptions made pursuant to the formal order 
were lawful. [para. 27]
Since the drug-related parts of the authorization 
could be separated from the firearm-offence related 
parts, the order could be divided. The valid drug-
related portion was preserved, which then formed 
the basis for the authorization. The interceptions 
made under the valid drug-related portion were 
therefore admissible. 
The accused had also contended that the 
investigative-necessity requirement for the 
authorization was not met and that it was 
prematurely granted. Under s. 186(1)(b) a judge can 
only grant an authorization if satisfied “that other 
investigative procedures have been tried and have 
failed, other investigative procedures are unlikely to 
succeed or the urgency of the matter is such that it 
would be impractical to carry out the investigation 
of the offence using  only other investigative 
procedures.” In the accused’s view, the police 
informer’s and/or DEA agents one-party consent, 
coupled with surveillance and other techniques, was 
a practical alternative at that stage of the 
investigative process. But Justice Frankel noted that 
the investigative necessity requirement must be 
assessed from a practical perspective, having  regard 
to the objectives of the investigation: 
... “There must be, practically speaking, no other 
reasonable alternative method of investigation, 
in the circumstances of the particular criminal 
inquiry.” (Emphasis in original.) Further, and of 
importance, is the fact that this requirement is to 
be considered having regard to the investigation 
as a whole, and not just with respect to those 
named as the targets of the authorization.
In this case, there were reasonable grounds to 
believe that [the accused] and others in Canada 
were involved in an international heroin-
distribution scheme and that the interception of 
private communications would assist in the 
investigation of their activities. As the trial judge 
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observed, [the accused’s] imminent meeting 
with an undercover D.E.A. agent presented the 
police with “a unique opportunity to gather 
evidence from discussions which might be 
generated from that meeting.” The interception 
of those discussions would likely result in the 
police determining who was involved in that 
scheme and how they operated. From a practical 
perspective, there was no other reasonable 
alternative method of pursuing the investigation 
of those criminal activities in a meaningful 
way. ... [O]ther investigative procedures alone 
were unlikely to provide evidence as to the full 
extent of the drug-related activities of not only 
[the accused], but also those who worked with 
him, and those who supplied the drugs. 
[references omitted, paras. 31-32]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
CROWN MUST ESTABLISH TWO 
HOUR WINDOW FOR 
PRESUMPTION TO APPLY 
R. v. Corey, 2011 NBCA 6
 
After drinking  some alcohol with 
others, the accused lost control of his 
truck and left the roadway, coming  to 
rest in a roadside ditch. One of his 
passengers was injured. At some 
point, the vehicle’s OnStar system reported the 
accident to police.  Police attended, demanded,and 
obtained two breath samples, both over 80mg  %. 
The accused was charged with impaired driving 
causing  bodily harm and causing  an accident 
resulting in bodily harm while over 80 mg %.  
At trial in New Brunswick Provincial Court the 
accused was acquitted. The Crown’s  success hinged 
upon the evidence of the breathalyzer results and 
their relation back to the time of the offence by 
application of the statutory presumption of 
equivalency found in s. 258(1)(d) of the Criminal 
Code. The trial judge found the Crown failed to 
discharge its burden of establishing  beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the first breath sample was 
taken no later than two hours after the offence. The 
Crown never called the first officer on scene nor the 
ambulance attendants to testify.
The Crown appealed, submitting  before the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal that the judge failed to 
consider the accused’s statement that was made to a 
police officer at the scene. When he was asked what 
time the accident occurred the accused replied, 
“You were there ten minutes after it happened,”. But 
this statement was inconclusive because other 
Crown evidence demonstrated that it could not be 
taken literally. The evidence suggested that the 
police likely arrived more than 10 minutes after the 
accident. Furthermore, how the accused assessed 
the 10 minute delay between the accident and 
police arrival was unknown. The accused’s appeal 
was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s note:  Remember, in order to give the 
breathalyzer demand under s. 254(3) of the Criminal 
Code, a police officer only need formulate their 
demand within three hours of the alleged driving. 
The standard for the breath demand is reasonable 
grounds. The two hour statutory presumption of 
equivalency provided by s. 258(1)(d), however, is 
triggered when the Crown establishes that the first 
breath sample was taken within two hours of the 
alleged driving. The standard for this is proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt.
PRIOR SEX CONVICTION 
MANDATES LIFE LONG ORDER
R. v. Baisley, 2011 NBCA 33
The accused pled guilty in New 
Brunswick Provincial Court to 
sexual assault under s. 271(1)(a) of 
the Criminal Code. Although the 
accused had two prior convictions 
for sexual assault under s. 271, the sentencing  judge 
ordered under s. 490.012 of the Criminal Code that 
he comply with the registration requirements of the 
Sex Offender Information Registration Act for only 
20 years, not life. 
The Crown’s appeal to the New Brunswick Court of 
Appeal that the order should have been for life was 
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successful. “The wording  of s. 490.012(3) and s. 
490.013(5) is clear and unambiguous, as is the 
inclusion of sexual assault (s. 271) as a designated 
offence under s. 490.011(1),” said the Court of 
Appeal. “The trial judge judge had no authority to 
order that the duration be for any term other than 
life.” 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
SEARCH WARRANT LAWFULLY 
OBTAINED: $1.3 M LAWSUIT SET 
ASIDE
Neumann v. Canada, 2011 BCCA 313
The plaintiff was the principal of a 
company that bought and sold used 
mining  and construction equipment. 
His private residence was the 
registered office of the company. He 
used a room on the second floor for that purpose. A 
person receiving  over $400,000 in commissions 
from the plaintiff on the sale of heavy machinery 
became the target of a Canada Revenue Agency 
(CRA) investigation for tax evasion. Neither the 
plaintiff nor his business were targets of the 
investigation. A criminal investigator for the CRA 
obtained a warrant to search the plaintiff’s house for 
the purpose of locating  and seizing 
cheques and other business 
documents related to the CRA 
target. At 9:00 am CRA officials, 
along  with two armed police 
officers to keep the peace, rang  the 
doorbell. The plaintiff answered 
and was advised of the warrant. 
He was told that he was not the 
subject of the investigation. Some 
files were downloaded from his office computer and 
he was also asked to produce other documentation 
from files stored in his basement. One of the police 
officers left between 10:00-10:30 am, a couple of 
the searchers left at 11:30 am, and by noon 
everyone was gone except two CRA employees who 
asked the plaintiff for a written statement. They left a 
half hour later. 
The plaintiff then sued the CRA in British Columbia 
Supreme Court alleging  it had negligently obtained 
the search warrant and had violated his Charter 
rights in the search of his home. He testified he was 
humiliated by the search and that neighbours 
witnessing  the police at his house did not accept his 
explanation that the CRA was investigating  someone 
else. He also said that he could not get over the 
effect the search had on him mentally or physically 
and that his business and many other aspects of his 
life had suffered. A psychiatrist testified that the 
plaintiff was traumatized from the shock of the 
unannounced search and was experiencing 
depression and post traumatic stress disorder, which 
would not have occurred if advance notice of the 
search had been given. The plaintiff argued that s. 8 
of the Charter imposed a duty on the investigator to 
minimize the intrusiveness of any search undertaken 
in the course of an investigation and that the CRA 
investigator negligently failed to do so when he 
sought and obtained the search warrant. The CRA 
investigator, on the other hand, said that a search 
warrant would give more assurance at getting  all of 
the sought after documents, rather than simply 
asking  for them (voluntary consent), or obtaining  a 
production order, due to the relationship between 
the plaintiff and the investigation’s target. 
The British Columbia Supreme 
Court judge concluded that the 
CRA agents owed a duty of care to 
the plaintiff in this search by tax 
investigators. A jury found that 
CRA employees infringed the 
plaintiff’s s. 8 Charter rights and 
had negligently obtained and 
executed the search warrant. The 
judge awarded the plainti f f 
$1,300,000.
The Attorney General of Canada and the CRA 
appealed the verdict to the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal. Justice Ryan, speaking  for the Court of 
Appeal, found there was no evidence that the search 
warrant was improperly obtained or executed nor 
any evidence of negligence or a Charter breach. 
“The arrival of police officers at one’s home armed 
with a warrant to search is doubtless an upsetting 
“The arrival of police officers 
at one’s home armed with a 
warrant to search is 
doubtless an upsetting and 
frightening event for anyone 
who experiences it.”
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and frightening  event for anyone who experiences 
it,” she said. “That said, the search warrant is an 
important and accepted enforcement tool utilized by 
those charged with investigating  crime. If a search 
warrant is lawfully obtained and 
executed, those subjected to it 
cannot seek compensation for its 
unintended repercussions.”
Negligent Investigation
The l aw r ecogn i ze s t ha t an 
investigating  police officer owes a 
duty of care to a suspect in the 
course of an investigation. The 
standard of this duty of care is the 
standard of a reasonable police 
officer in like circumstances. But in 
this case the plaintiff was not a 
suspect; he was a third party. 
Assuming  that the trial judge was 
correct in holding  that the CRA had a duty to the 
plaintiff in carrying  out the least intrusive search in 
the circumstances (an issue the Court of Appeal left 
for another day), the search was reasonable. The 
investigator chose to obtain a search warrant, rather 
than relying  on other investigative alternatives, 
because of the close relationship that may have 
existed between the target of the 
investigation and the plaintiff. The 
investigator could not be sure that 
the plaintiff would produce all of 
the records pertaining  to the 
commissions paid if simply asked. 
And it didn’t matter whether the 
investigator actually held this belief 
at the time he sought the search 
warrant, or whether he was simply justifying  his 
actions at the time of trial. “The question is whether 
a reasonable investigator, knowing  what [the 
investigator in this case] knew, would have 
concluded that a search warrant was necessary in 
this case,” said Justice Ryan. “In my view, it would 
have been open to an investigator to reach that 
conclusion. In fact, one might argue that the 
investigator would have failed in his duties to his 
employer to do otherwise.” 
s. 8 Charter Breach
The Court of Appeal found that the search warrant 
was justified and therefore there was no Charter 
breach. “A search which is 
conducted under a valid warrant 
must be said to be a reasonable 
search unless the search itself is 
conducted unreasonably,” said 
Justice Ryan. The fact that CRA 
agents were accompanied by two 
uniformed and armed police 
officers did not render the manner 
in which the search was conducted 
unreasonable. “Police are asked to 
accompany CRA agents in order to 
keep peace. In this case, as it 
turned out, there was no trouble 
that the police needed to deal with. 
[The plaint i f f ] accepted the 
authority of the warrant and was 
co-operative. Not long  into the search the officers 
left the premises. Nothing  in these events could be 
said to make the search unreasonable.” Nor did 
investigators unnecessarily intrude into other places 
within the plaintiff’s home. They searched in only 
two places where company records were kept and 
no other part of the house was searched. There was 
no evidence to support a claim 
of an unreasonable search and 
the issue should not have been 
left with the jury. 
The finding  of negligence and 
the Charter breach were set 
as ide and the case was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Note-able Quote
“My grandfather once told me that there are two 
kinds of people:  those who work and those who 
take the credit. He told me to try to be in the first 
group; there was less competition there.” - Indira 
Gandhi
“[T]he search warrant is 
an important and accepted 
enforcement tool utilized 
by those charged with 
investigating crime. If a 
search warrant is lawfully 
obtained and executed, 
those subjected to it 
cannot seek compensation 
for its unintended 
repercussions.”
“A search which is conducted 
under a valid warrant must be 
said to be a reasonable search 
unless the search itself is 
conducted unreasonably”
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CHARTER RIGHTS ARE 
PERSONAL
R. v. Ramos, 2011 SKCA 63                                
  
Police stopped a Jeep for speeding. It 
was clocked on radar travelling  at 
150 km/h in a 110 km/h zone. The 
officer advised the male driver that 
he had been travelling  a little quickly. 
There were two other occupants. A female passenger 
was in the front seat and the accused, a female 
passenger, was in the back of the vehicle lying  on 
top of a blanket. The officer told the accused that she 
should be wearing  a seatbelt, but she did not react. 
After making  several observations, the officer 
considered a number of factors which in his 
experience led him to have a reasonable suspicion 
of drug  trafficking. However, there was no source 
information, no tips, no anonymous information, no 
electronic surveillance, or no other police 
information suggesting  a drug  offence. About 10 to 
12 minutes after the initial stop, the officer advised 
the driver he was being  detained for transporting  a 
controlled substance and that he was not free to go. 
He was informed of his right to contact a lawyer and 
also given the police warning. The passengers, 
however, were not apprised of the situation and 
remained in the Jeep. A police dog  was run around 
the vehicle’s exterior and it made a positive 
indication, sitting at the rear of the Jeep. 
After considering  his observations and the dog’s 
response, the officer believed that there were drugs 
in the vehicle and all three occupants were arrested 
for drug  trafficking. The vehicle was then searched 
and an after-market compartment was discovered in 
the rear cargo area beneath where the accused was 
laying  at the time the vehicle was initially stopped. 
The compartment was operated by two electronic 
locks and a hydraulic lift. Inside the compartment 
was a bag  with two bricks of cocaine, each weighing 
just over one kilogram. A black and white purse 
containing  the accused’s identification and a camera 
was located in the vehicle. The purse, which had 
been held in police custody, was searched again 11 
days after the arrest. In it, a telescopic automotive 
magnet was found that could be used to open the 
after-market compartment. The accused was charged 
with possessing  cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking.
 
A Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench judge 
found that the accused was not detained prior to her 
arrest and therefore her s. 9 Charter  rights were not 
breached. In addition, the accused did not assert any 
power or control over the vehicle or the contents of 
the cargo area. Thus, she failed to establish any 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle or 
FACTORS THE OFFICER SAID 
GROUNDED HIS SUSPICION
(1) The driver was operating a third  party vehicle. In the  officer’s 
experience and drug enforcement training, he was aware  that 
couriers often use  third party vehicles. The driver had a shocked 
look on  his face when asked who the vehicle belonged to and 
stated that it was not his vehicle. When asked  for the  car 
registration, the driver responded that it was not his rather than 
producing the  registration. In  the  officer’s experience, people 
transporting drugs try to distance  themselves in  this way from 
the vehicle and its contents.
(2) The officer believed that the driver  did  not know in whose name 
the vehicle  was registered. He believed the driver was reading 
the registration to confirm who the vehicle  belonged to, although 
he said the  vehicle was owned by Tran. The officer  felt that this 
behaviour was consistent with the use of a third  party vehicle to 
transport drugs and not the innocent motoring public.
(3) The driver was nervous and continued to be nervous as the 
stop continued contrary to  innocent members of the motoring 
public who  are only nervous initially when stopped by the police. 
In the officer’s experience, drug couriers continue to be nervous 
until  the drugs are found and then there is a  de-escalation in 
their display of nervousness.
(4) Sleeping blankets and pillows in the vehicle suggested  that the 
occupants of the vehicle  were spending extended periods of 
time in the vehicle and possibly rotating drivers. In  the officer’s 
experience, drug  traffickers want to get from point A to point B 
as soon  as possible to minimize the  risk of contact with law 
enforcement and also do not want to stay in hotels because 
they do not want to leave the drugs unprotected.
(5) The passenger (accused) lying in the vehicle made little eye 
contact and no attempt to correct her seating position after the 
comment about her not wearing a seatbelt. The officer became 
suspicious that the accused did not correct her seating position 
because there might be something under the blanket that she 
was trying to conceal. 
(6) Although the driver volunteered the reason for his trip and 
provided his student permit, the officer found this to be 
suspicious because drug couriers often rehearse stories and 
documents ready to legitimize their trips if questioned.
(7) The vehicle was travelling from west to east and, according to 
the officer, drugs generally move from west to east and cash 
moves from east to west.
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in the contents of the cargo area. The 
accused’s s. 8 rights were not 
breached by either the dog  search or 
the search of the vehicle. However, 
the judge determined that the 
accused did have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy with respect to 
her purse and that searching  it was 
unreasonable. The judge then went 
on to consider the breaches of the 
the driver’s Charter rights in relation 
to the lawfulness of the accused’s 
arrest. The judge concluded that the 
police did not meet the reasonable 
suspicion standard in detaining  the driver or for 
using  the sniffer dog. But for the driver’s rights not 
being  breached, the accused would not have been 
arrested and her purse would not have been 
searched. The breaches to the driver’s rights rendered 
the accused’s arrest unlawful and  the search of the 
purse unreasonable; it was conducted as an incident 
to an unlawful arrest. The contents of the purse were 
excluded as evidence under s. 24(2) and the 
accused was acquitted. 
The Crown appealed the accused’s acquittal to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal arguing  the trial 
judge erred by excluding  the contents of the purse 
on the basis that it had been obtained as a result of a 
violation of the driver’s Charter rights rather than the 
accused’s own personal rights. Furthermore, the 
Crown submitted that the driver’s ss. 8 and 9 Charter 
rights were not violated and that the trial judge 
demanded too high a standard for reasonable 
suspicion. Finally, the Crown 
suggested that the evidence was 
admissible under s. 24(2). The 
accused, on the other hand, 
suggested that the trial judge 
properly considered the facts, 
applied the appropriate standard of 
reasonable suspicion, and properly 
excluded the evidence under s. 
24(2).  As well, she contended that 
the trial judge correctly considered 
breaches of the driver’s rights in 
relation to her arrest and the search 
of her purse. The driver’s Charter 
breaches were causal ly and 
temporally connected to her arrest 
and the search so as to render the 
evidence in the purse obtained in a 
manner which violated the Charter. 
Thus, in her view, exclusion under s. 
24(2) was available.
 
Justice Ottenbreit, speaking  for the 
unanimous Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal, ruled that the trial judge 
erred by excluding  the contents of 
the purse against the accused 
because of a breach of the driver’s 
rights. “The law is well established 
that section 8 Charter rights are 
personal rights,” he said. “To exclude evidence 
under s. 24(2), the applicant must prove that his or 
her personal privacy rights, not just another person’s 
rights, were violated.” Justice Ottenbreit summarized 
the applicable principles as follows:
1.  A claim for relief under s. 24(2) of the Charter 
can only be made by the person whose Charter 
rights have been infringed.
2. Like all Charter rights, s. 8  protects people, not 
places; it is a personal right.
3. The right to challenge the legality of a search 
depends upon whether the accused had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, which is to 
be determined on the totali ty of the 
circumstances.
In this case, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial 
judge that the accused was 
not detained prior to her 
arrest. But, unlike the trial 
judge, it found the accused’s 
arrest lawful, as was the 
search that followed. “The 
power of search incidental to 
arrest has long  been an 
exception to the general rule 
that a search conducted 
without prior authorization is 
presumptively unreasonable,” 
said Justice Ottenbreit. “Such 
a search does not require 
reasonable and probable 
grounds beyond the grounds 
“The law is well 
established that section 8 
Charter rights are 
personal rights. To 
exclude evidence under s. 
24(2), the applicant must 
prove that his or her 
personal privacy rights, 
not just another person’s 
rights, were violated.”
“The power of search incidental 
to arrest has long been an 
exception to the general rule that 
a search conducted without prior 
authorization is presumptively 
unreasonable. Such a search 
does not require reasonable and 
probable grounds beyond the 
grounds that were sufficient to 
support the lawfulness of the 
arrest itself.”
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that were sufficient to support the lawfulness of the 
arrest itself.” He continued:
[T]the starting point for determining  whether [the 
accused’s] arrest was lawful must be the 
circumstances vis-à-vis her and not [the driver]. 
Although it is not clear whether the drugs were 
already found when she was initially arrested, 
the reason for her arrest was certainly the 
positive indication by the dog. The trial judge 
had already concluded that [the accused] had 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
vehicle and its contents, and that her s. 8  Charter 
rights had not been breached by the dog search. 
The refusal by the trial judge to exclude the 
drugs as against [the accused] is consistent with 
that lack of breach of [her] Charter rights. There 
was therefore no basis for excluding  the dog 
search from the factors which inform the 
presence of reasonable and probable grounds for 
arrest in the analysis of whether the arrest was 
lawful.
 
The police are empowered to arrest a person 
under the authority of ss. 495(1)(a) and (b) of the 
Code, which reads as follows:
495.(1) A peace officer may arrest without 
warrant
(a) a person who has committed an indictable 
offence or who, on reasonable grounds, he 
believes has committed or is about to commit an 
indictable offence;
(b) a person whom he finds committing a 
criminal offence...
The positive indication by the dog and the 
subsequent finding of drugs justified [the 
accused’s] arrest on either the basis of a criminal 
offence being committed or reasonable grounds 
to believe that an offence had been or would be 
committed as contemplated by s. 495(1) of the 
Criminal Code. Her arrest was therefore neither 
baseless nor capricious, in the words of Grant, 
supra, and was not arbitrary and did not infringe 
the Charter. The arrest of [the accused] was 
lawful and the subsequent search of her purse 
incidental to her arrest was therefore lawful as 
well. [paras. 27-28]
The contents of the accused’s purse were admissible, 
the Crown’s appeal was allowed, the acquittal set 
aside, and a new trial was ordered.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
‘POLICE OFFICERS ARE NOT 
ABOVE THE LAW’
R. v. Kelly, 2010 NBCA 89
The accused’s mobile home came to 
the attention of police as a by-
product of an active drug  trafficking 
investigation, named “Operation 
Jellybean”, and warrant was sought 
to search warrant it. Operation Jellybean included 
searches of police databases, an undercover 
operation, confidential informants, search warrants, 
tracking  warrants, number recorder warrants, 
wiretap authorizations and extensive daily 
surveillance, both electronic and physical. But none 
of the information gathered directly implicated the 
accused or his residence in the drug  trafficking 
activities. He was not named as a target of the initial 
investigation nor identified as a participant in any of 
the communications intercepted. However, over a 
period of nearly four months, surveillance personnel 
spotted one of the suspects and his vehicle at the 
accused’s mobile home on four occasions. There 
was nothing  in the ITO for the search warrant, 
however, to indicate that the suspect actually met 
the accused or entered his residence, or retrieved 
anything  from or made a delivery to the residence. A 
FLIR check on the accused’s residence was negative 
for a heat source which would have been consistent 
with a marihuana grow-operation. 
Police attended the accused’s home and tried to buy 
cocaine from him, but this was not successful. The 
following  day the main suspect and two other 
targets, were arrested. Cocaine was seized during 
personal and vehicular searches incidental to those 
arrests. While an officer attended before a Provincial 
Court judge to swear the ITO and seek the search 
warrant for the accused’s home, four other officers 
were dispatched to the residence. A superior officer 
as headquarters told the officers to enter and 
“secure” the premises so incriminating  evidence 
could not be removed or destroyed, even though the 
superior was not acquainted with the circumstances 
nor have any source information that there was a 
real danger of the imminent elimination of evidence. 
The officers knocked on the front door, but received 
no response. No vehicles were in the driveway and 
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there was nothing  to indicate a 
possibility of persons being  inside 
the re s idence . The o f f i ce r s 
nonetheless forced open the front 
door and entered, identifying 
themselves as “police”. They 
searched every room to confirm the 
residence was unoccupied. Once 
this two minute search was 
completed, the officers withdrew. 
Nothing  was removed. Within an 
hour the search warrant was issued, 
but the ITO did not include the 
failed cocaine solicitation nor the 
warrantless entry. When the search 
warrant arrived it was executed and 
seven pounds of marihuana and other drug 
paraphernalia was found inside the accused’s trailer. 
 
At trial in New Brunswick Provincial Court none of 
the officers testifying  could identify a presenting 
circumstance indicative of a real risk of the 
destruction or removal of incriminating  evidence 
from the premises. They said they complied with the 
instructions to enter that had been given by their 
superior. The trial judge found the ITO contained 
enough evidence allowing  the issuing  judge to infer 
there were reasonable grounds for the belief that the 
things to be searched for “could” be in the accused’s 
residence and that the police had suspicions that 
there may have been drugs there. However, she held 
that the accused’s s. 8  Charter rights were violated 
by the prior warrantless forced entry and search. In 
her view, there were no “exigent circumstances” that 
could justify the warrantless entry and search under 
s. 11(7) of the CDSA. “While the police could have 
attended at the trailer and secured the premises from 
anyone entering  until the warrant arrived, I cannot 
find the grounds to justify the warrantless entry on 
‘exigent circumstances’,” she said. Nonetheless, the 
the marihuana seized pursuant to the warrant was 
admitted under s. 24(2).  The accused was convicted 
of possessing  marihuana for the purpose of 
trafficking and sentenced to 26 months in jail.
 
The accused appealed his conviction to the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that the 
trial judge erred in finding  there were reasonable 
grounds to believe the “things to 
be searched for” were inside. He 
also submitted that the evidence 
should have been excluded under 
s. 24(2). 
The Court of Appeal found the ITO did not provide 
the necessary reasonable grounds for its issuance 
and did not disclose information that the ITO 
deponent had to know was both relevant and 
significant. Chief Justice Drapeau, delivering  the 
Court’s opinion, first noted:
[I]t is necessary to state a truism: police officers 
are not above the law and Canadians rightly 
expect and assume they will discharge their 
professional responsibilities with punctilious 
respect for the law. After all, the official motto of 
the RCMP is “maintiens le droit”, not “the end 
justifies the means”. Indeed, the proposition that 
our country is founded upon principles that 
recognize the supremacy of the rule of law is 
enshrined in the introduction to the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. That text, the 
contents of which form part of the supreme law 
of the land, goes on to enunciate a number of 
rights that all Canadians, no matter how modest 
their station in life, are entitled to enjoy to the 
fullest extent, free of unauthorized state 
interference. Of those rights, one of the most 
cherished is guaranteed by s. 8, the right to be 
secure against “unreasonable” search or seizure, 
and its breach in relation to a person’s home is 
viewed by most citizens, and all courts, as 
particularly offensive. It is now settled law that a 
police search complies with s. 8  only if it was 
executed in a reasonable manner and was 
authorized by a law, which itself meets 
minimum constitutional standards. [para. 1]
“[P]olice officers are not 
above the law and 
Canadians rightly expect 
and assume they will 
discharge their professional 
responsibilities with 
punctilious respect for the 
law. After all, the official 
motto of the RCMP is 
“maintiens le droit”, not “the 
end justifies the means”.”  
punctilious - 
strictly attentive to minute 
details of form in action or 
conduct; showing great 
attention to detail or correct 
behaviour. 
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The Warrantless Entry & Search
 
The forcible entry and warrantless search of the 
accused’s residence were unlawful and breached s. 
8  of the Charter, a matter conceded by Crown. No 
prior judicial authorization had 
been obtained and police knew of 
no exigent circumstances that 
might have legitimized their 
conduct. For unexplained reasons, 
a superior officer issued the order 
to enter. There was no evidence 
provided for the existence of 
exigent circumstances. “I can only 
conclude the warrantless entry and 
search of [the 
accused’s] home 
was carried out with shocking 
insouciance for the law and [his] 
constitutional rights,” said Justice 
Drapeau. He continued: 
[Section] 11(7) of the CDSA allows a police 
officer to search a place for a controlled 
substance without a warrant if the conditions 
precedent to issuance exist “but by reason of 
exigent circumstances it would be impracticable 
to obtain one”. Exigent circumstances exist 
when the thing to be searched for is at imminent 
risk of disappearance.
 
It is trite law that positive results do not 
retroactively clothe a search with the 
mantle of reasonableness: the search 
must be authorized at law before it is 
undertaken. However, evidence gathered 
as a result of a search that, in one way or 
another, violates s. 8  may yet form part 
of the record at trial if its admission 
would not bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. [paras. 3-4]
 
The Warrant
Section 11(1) of the CDSA allows a judge 
to issue a search warrant only if satisfied by 
information on oath that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe the thing  to be searched for, 
commonly a controlled substance, is in the place to 
be searched. But Justice Drapeau cautioned, “neither 
outright falsehoods nor what might be called lies of 
omission have their place in the application process, 
the deponent’s duty to the court, and to the 
administration of justice in general, being  to ensure 
the ITO, in essence, tells the truth, the whole truth 
and nothing  but the truth.” As for how s. 
11(1) enabled a search, he stated:
Under s. 11(1) of the CDSA, the issuing 
judge must be satisfied that the thing to be 
searched for is in the place to be searched. 
In the case at bar, the issuing judge had to 
be satisfied the ITO demonstrated: (1) the 
deponent believed an offence had been 
committed; and (2) evidence of that 
offence would be found in [the accused’s] 
r e s idence . The ITO a l so had to 
demonstrate this belief was based upon 
reasonable grounds. In contrast, the question for 
the trial judge was whether “there was sufficient 
credible and reliable evidence to permit [the 
issuing judge] to find reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that an offence had been 
committed and that evidence of that offence 
would be found at the specified time and place”. 
[para. 39]
The Court of Appeal found “the trial judge applied 
an impermissibly low standard” in concluding  that it 
was reasonable to conclude there was a possibility 
that incriminating  evidence could be 
found at the mobile home. Mere 
police suspicion or the possibility of 
finding  evidence at the specified 
place, even if reasonable, is not a 
sufficient basis for the lawful issuance 
of a search warrant. Although  the 
substantive sufficiency of the ITO 
stands to be assessed on both the 
evidence that is explicitly articulated 
and all inferences that may be 
reasonably drawn from the record, at 
best the ITO only gave rise to 
suspicions. 
 
Furthermore, “in seeking  a search warrant, the ITO 
deponent must not only set out the relevant facts 
fully and truthfully, he or she must do so ‘plainly’,” 
said Chief Justice Drapeau. “Misleading  statements 
and exaggerations of the available intelligence are 
“[T]he warrantless 
entry and search of 
[the accused’s] home 
was carried out with 
shocking insouciance 
for the law and [his] 
constitutional rights.”  
insouciance - 
lack of care or 
concern.
“[P]ositive results 
do not retroactively 
clothe a search with 
the mantle of 
reasonableness: the 
search must be 
authorized at law 
before it is 
undertaken.”  
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not acceptable. Moreover, the deponent’s disclosure 
obligations require him or her ‘to reveal, not to 
conceal, any unconstitutional investigative step by 
which the authorities have secured information 
relevant to the ongoing  investigation’.” Here, the ITO 
did not inform the issuing  judge of several things, 
including  the ITO deponent’s unsuccessful attempt 
at purchasing  drugs from the accused prior to 
applying  for the warrant nor of the prior forcible 
police entry and warrantless search of the mobile 
home. The failure of the deponent to incorporate this 
information in the ITO can only be viewed as an 
“extremely egregious breach of his duty ...  (1) to 
make full, fair and frank disclosure to the issuing 
judge; and (2) to set out the relevant facts truthfully, 
fully and plainly.”
  
Section 24(2)
After considering  the factors in the s. 24(2) analysis 
(the seriousness of the Charter-infringing  state 
conduct, the impact of the breach on the Charter-
protected interests of the accused, and society’s 
interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits) 
the Court of Appeal found that the admission of the 
marihuana seized from the accused’s home would 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute: 
To summarize, the record reveals: (1) four RCMP 
officers attended at [the accused’s] residence, 
broke open its front door, entered and 
conducted a search of its interior, all without any 
prior judicial authorization and in the absence 
of exigent circumstances; (2) the hearing  before 
the issuing judge proceeded to its conclusion on 
the basis of an informational record that the ITO 
deponent knew was incomplete in material 
respects; (3) the key provision of the ITO 
purporting to tie, in a direct way, [the accused’s 
home] to the drug  trafficking  operation under 
investigation (as a drug selling  and storage 
location) is misleading in significant respects; (4) 
both searches were unreasonable because the 
requisite reasonable grounds for the issuance of 
a warrant did not exist. The first was also 
unreasonable because there were no exigent 
circumstances. As for the second search, it 
cannot be legitimized by the warrant because of 
the ITO deponent’s egregious breaches of his 
duties to the issuing  judge, most notably his 
duties of candour and full disclosure; (5) the 
rights violations are not minor or technical in 
nature and relate to [the accused’s] home; (6) the 
evidence seized is a controlled substance that 
has acquired a reputation, deserved or not, for 
being less deleterious than certain other illegal 
drugs ...; and (7) the charge does not involve a 
serious violent crime. [para. 63]
And further:
In closing, I would add that, if this Court were to 
rule against evidential exclusion in a case such 
as the present one, it might be seen as paying 
mere lip service to the importance of s. 8  rights 
in relation to a dwelling-house and trivializing 
the duties of ITO deponents. In my respectful 
judgment, doing  right according to law requires 
exclusion of the marihuana seized at [the 
accused’s] home ... . [para. 65] 
 
The accused’s appeal was allowed, his conviction 
was set aside, the evidence was excluded, and an 
acquittal was entered. 
Complete case available at www.canli.org
FAILURE TO MENTION ABSENCE 
OF ODOUR DID NOT 
UNDERMINE SEARCH WARRANT
R. v. Nguyen & Nguyen, 2011 ONCA 465
 
After receiving  detailed information 
from an anonymous first time tipster 
that a house was being  used as a 
marijuana grow-op, the police went 
to the premises and confirmed 
much of the information provided by the tipster: all 
the windows and doors, except one, were covered; 
in the one uncovered window, a single ceiling  light 
could be seen; the grass was not well kept; there was 
moisture damage on the roof of the house that was 
not visible on any other roof in the neighbourhood; 
there were two exterior timers on the house; and 
there was no snow accumulated by the vents, unlike 
similar snow covered vents on neighbouring 
roofs. Marijuana could not be smelled, nor were any 
fans or blowers heard.  Other police investigation 
revealed no garbage or recycling  placed at the curb, 
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a license plate number was registered to one of the 
accuseds, and a thermal imaging  device detected an 
unusual amount of heat emitting  from the chimney 
and vents on the roof. Hydro consumption records 
at the house indicated that consumption was lower 
than that of the neighbouring  houses of similar size 
and was not sufficient to support a marijuana grow 
operation, leading  police to believe there was theft 
of electricity. A second anonymous source provided 
information that no one lived at the property but an 
Asian male and female had been seen loading 
garbage bags into a van at the house. An ITO was 
sworn, which, in addition to summarizing  the 
information and other police observations, stated the 
officer had experience and training  related to indoor 
and outdoor marihuana growing  operations.  A 
search warrant under the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act was obtained and police found a 
significant marihuana grow operation inside the 
residence. The two accuseds, who were present at 
the property at the time of the search, were charged 
with producing  marihuana and possessing  it for the 
purpose of trafficking.  
The Ontario Superior Court of Justice concluded that 
the search warrant should not have been issued. The 
judge found that some of the statements in the ITO 
were misleading  and that there were several 
omissions of fact that should have been included.  
She concluded that the ITO “was carelessly drafted, 
materially misleading  and factually incomplete.” The 
warrant was struck down, the search was 
unreasonable under s. 8 of the Charter, and the 
evidence was excluded under s. 24(2). Acquittals 
followed. 
The Crown appealed the acquittals, suggesting  that 
the trial judge erred, among  other grounds, by 
finding  that there were misleading  statements 
contained in the ITO and that the officer failed to 
disclose certain facts that he did not observe. As 
well, the Crown suggested that there were 
reasonable and probable grounds to justify the 
search. 
Justice Blair, authoring  the unanimous Ontario Court 
of Appeal judgment, first summarized the legal test 
for reviewing the sufficiency of a search warrant:
The ultimate test is whether – after excising  any 
offending  portions of the ITO – there remains a 
sufficient basis on the record before the issuing 
justice, as amplified on the review, for issuance 
of the warrant. Other factors may be taken into 
account when arriving  at that assessment. For 
example, misleading statements made to obtain 
the warrant, or a failure to make full and fair 
disclosure in the ITO – depending  on the nature 
and severity of these faults – may provide a basis 
for challenging  the decision to grant the warrant. 
Care must also be taken to confirm the reliability 
of information obtained from tipsters where that 
information forms a material basis for the 
application. [references omitted, para. 23]
And later, while noting  that few applications for a 
search warrant are perfect, stated:
[T]he central consideration on the review of a 
search warrant is whether on the record as it 
existed before the issuing  justice and as 
amplified at the hearing, with any offending 
portions of the ITO excised, there remains a 
sufficient basis upon which the warrant could be 
issued.  Police conduct is clearly relevant to that 
consideration.  However, the review is not an 
exercise in examining  the conduct of the police 
with a fine-toothed comb, fastening on their 
minor errors or acts or omissions, and 
embellishing those flaws to the point where it is 
the police conduct that is on trial rather than the 
sufficiency of the evidence in support of the 
application. This is particularly so where, as 
here, the trial judge has specifically found that 
the applicant did not intend to mislead the 
issuing justice. [para. 57]
“[T]he review [of a search warrant] is not an exercise in examining the conduct of the police 
with a fine-toothed comb, fastening on their minor errors or acts or omissions, and 
embellishing those flaws to the point where it is the police conduct that is on trial rather than 
the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the application.”  
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Training
One of the alleged misstatements that the trial judge 
found to be misleading  was that the officer said he 
had “training” in grow-operations. He had stated:
I have experience and training relating to indoor 
and outdoor Marihuana growing operations. As 
a result of previous Marihuana growing 
operation investigations, I have become familiar 
with the signs and appearance of the buildings 
being used to house such operations.
The Court of Appeal, however, found the the officer 
did have training  in the investigation of marijuana 
grow operations.  Although it was not some sort of 
“formal” training, such as a classroom course, he did 
have “on the job training”, including  training  from 
other experienced officers. “‘Formal’ training  is one 
form of training, to be sure, but on the job practical 
training  is valuable and counts 
as well,” said Justice Blair.  “It 
ought not to be discounted out 
of hand.” Further, although the 
officer’s experience was not 
extensive, he did have some. 
He had been involved with six 
to nine other marijuana grow 
operation investigations.  There 
was nothing  misleading  or 
inconsistent with his statement.  
Omitting  the Not Seen, 
Not Heard, Not Done 
 
The trial judge was critical of the officer for not 
expressly negativing  several facts in the ITO, which 
were characterized as omissions. These included 
such things as not stating  that there was no smell of 
marijuana or that fans or blowers were not heard. As 
well, the ITO did not mention that there was no 
evidence of electricity theft, no actions of a grow-op 
aside from that provided by the anonymous sources, 
and no observations of suspicious activity. However, 
the Court of Appeal disagreed with this. “In my view, 
these alleged failures to address things not seen or 
investigative steps not taken – considered 
individually or taken as a whole in the context of all 
‘omissions of fact’ – do not amount to material non-
disclosure that would undermine the issuance of the 
warrant,” said Justice Blair. 
An applicant for a search warrant has a duty to make 
full, frank, and fair disclosure of all material facts in 
the ITO supporting  the request, which includes the 
duty not to omit material facts. But “the absence or 
reference to something  not seen, not heard, or not 
done, will [in most cases] lead to the sensible 
inference that whatever it is was not seen, not heard 
or not done.”  In this case, the facts were not known 
or matters not observed by the police. This was 
different than cases where facts known to the police 
at the time were not disclosed in the ITO.  “Although 
there may be circumstances in which the duty to 
provide full and fair disclosure will require an 
applicant for a search warrant to negative something 
unseen or not done, I would expect such 
circumstances to arise infrequently,” said Justice 
Blair. He continued:
The obligation on applicants for a search 
warrant is not to commit the error of 
material non-disclosure.  “Materiality” is 
something that bears on the merits or 
substance of the application rather than 
on its form or some other inconsequential 
matter. There is no obligation on 
applicants to anticipate, and to explain 
away in advance, every conceivable 
indicia of crime they did not see or sense 
and every conceivable investigative step 
they did not take at the time in order to 
counter the creative arguments of able 
defence counsel on a review hearing 
many months or years after the event. Here, for 
the most part, the impugned “omissions of fact” 
relied upon by the trial judge fall into the latter 
type of category, or they are simply immaterial, 
or were not omissions at all.
The failure by [the officer] to note that he had 
failed to smell the pungent odour of marijuana 
or to hear the sound of fans or blowers that are 
characteristic of marijuana grow operations 
warrants some consideration.  He admitted in 
cross-examination that he had tried to smell 
marijuana, but had not, and that he had not 
heard the sound of fans or blowers.  He also 
acknowledged that sometimes the smell of 
marijuana can be sensed and that, on such 
“[T]he absence or 
reference to something 
not seen, not heard, or 
not done, will [in most 
cases] lead to the 
sensible inference that 
whatever it is was not 
seen, not heard or not 
done.” 
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occasion, he is able to tell the issuing justice that 
he believes there is a grow operation in the 
home based on that.  However, the trial judge 
failed to advert to [the officer’s] additional 
evidence that he had only been able to smell the 
odour of marijuana outdoors at two of the eight 
or nine grow operations he had previously 
attended, and to hear fans or blowers on one of 
those occasions.  He testified that on most 
occasions “you cannot detect the odour of 
marijuana outside”, and “it’s not very often that 
you can [hear fans or blowers].” 
Thus, there is nothing on the record to indicate 
that the absence of the smell of marijuana or the 
sounds of fans outside a grow operation home is 
a common indicia of the absence of a marijuana 
grow operation inside.  I see little need for the 
applicant to postulate such a possibility in the 
ITO and then explain it away.  The record, as 
amplified, explained it away in any event. I 
agree with the observations of [the officer] in 
cross-examination that the issuing Justice would 
likely have assumed from the fact that he did not 
say he had smelled the odour of marijuana or 
heard the sounds of fans or blowers, that he had 
not. These alleged omissions are insignificant. 
[references omitted, paras. 51-53]
The purported omissions were not material nor, for 
the most part, properly characterized as omissions in 
the circumstances.
Section 24(2)
 
Since there was no s. 8 breach it was unnecessary to 
address s. 24(2). However, even if there was a s. 8 
breach, the Court of Appeal would have admitted 
the evidence. 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the order quashing 
the search warrant was set aside, and a new trial was 
ordered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Note-able Quote
“There is no pillow so soft as a clear conscience.” - 
French Proverb
OFFICER HAD GROUNDS 
TO ARREST: 
SEARCH LAWFUL
R. v. Perjalian, 2011 BCCA 323
Police saw a vehicle turn abruptly 
into a lane, speed well over the 
limit, and stop behind an apartment 
building. The passenger quickly got 
out and entered the building. Two 
police officers followed and stopped behind the car. 
As the driver (accused) was getting  out of the 
vehicle, he was detained for the purpose of 
investigating  the speeding  violation, an offence 
under British Columbia’s Motor Vehicle Act. The 
officer asked the accused for his driver’s licence and 
registration, but only a licence was produced. A 
half-full bottle of beer was observed in the centre 
console of the car. When asked again for the car’s 
registration, the accused turned towards the car as if 
he intended to get the registration and appeared to 
deliberately position himself to block the officer’s 
view. The officer saw the accused reach with his 
right hand and drop a plastic film container on the 
floor, making  no attempt to pick it up or look for the 
registration. He just turned back and said he could 
not find it. The officer, a 28 year veteran with 10 
years on a drug  squad, formed the belief there were 
drugs in the film container and that the accused was 
arrestable for either possessing  the drugs for the 
purpose of trafficking  or for simple possession. He 
ordered the accused out of the car, retrieved the film 
container, and opened it, finding  13 “rocks” of crack 
cocaine and a “ball” of powder cocaine. The 
accused was then arrested for possessing  cocaine for 
the purpose of trafficking, handcuffed, searched, and 
advised him of his right to retain and instruct 
counsel. The accused said he wished to speak with a 
lawyer. The car was then searched and a scoresheet 
(a form of a drug-trafficker’s bookkeeping) was 
found. Cash in the amount of $270 was also seized. 
While waiting  for police transport, the officer asked 
the accused if he had a crack pipe or needle, to 
which he responded, “Do I look like a fucking 
junkie?” 
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At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
officer testified that he believed the film container 
held drugs because of the accused’s obvious attempt 
to dispose of it without detection and, in his 
experience, containers are used extensively by drug 
dealers to store and transport their drugs. The officer 
also said that he did not believe he was prohibited 
from questioning  a suspect who had asked to speak 
to counsel. He said he had done so in the past. The 
judge found the accused was under detention when 
the officers approached him initially to investigate 
the traffic violation. Police breached ss. 10(a) and (b) 
of the Charter because they failed to immediately 
inform him of the reason for his detention or of his 
right to counsel at the outset of the investigation and, 
later, when the officer came to believe the accused 
was in possession of drugs. Sections 10(a) and (b) 
were only complied with when the accused was 
arrested, some three minutes after the investigation 
began. 
As for the search, it was reasonable. The officer’s 
subjective belief that the film container held drugs 
was credible and objectively reasonable based on 
the officer’s experience and the circumstances in 
which he observed the container. His belief was not 
based on a mere hunch. The seizure and search of 
the container were lawful. Even though the accused 
was not actually arrested until shortly after the search 
the officer had reasonable grounds to arrest the 
accused when the search occurred; it was therefore 
justified as a search incidental to arrest. As for the 
accused’s statement, the officer committed a “clear, 
conscious and flagrant breach” of s. 10(b) in 
obtaining  it by questioning  the accused after he 
indicated he wished to speak to counsel but had not 
yet been given an opportunity to do so. Although the 
Crown did not seek to admit the statement, the judge 
considered this s. 10(b) breach to be relevant as part 
of a pattern of Charter  abuse in the s. 24(2) analysis 
for the drugs and score sheet. The evidence was 
ultimately admitted and the accused was convicted 
of possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. 
The accused appealed, arguing  (in part) before the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal, that the judge 
erred in failing  to find that police breached his s. 8 
Charter rights and the evidence should have been 
excluded. In his view, the Crown did not establish 
the subjective or objective grounds for his arrest. He 
had no record for drug  offences and the police had 
no information linking  him or the vehicle to drug-
related activity, nor did the officer see or smell drugs. 
Although the presence of an opaque film canister in 
the car and his conduct may have been suspicious, it 
fell far short of providing  reasonable grounds to 
justify the arrest for a drug offence. 
The Search
Justice Neilson, writing  the unanimous judgment, 
first noted that the “search of the film container was 
prima facie unlawful because it was conducted 
without a warrant.” However, an exception to this 
rule exists when a search is conducted as an incident 
to arrest. A lawful arrest requires reasonable grounds, 
which encompasses both a subjective and an 
objective component. In this case, (1) the officer was 
required to honestly believe he had grounds to arrest 
the accused for a drug  offence, and (2) a reasonable 
person standing  in the officer’s position would need 
to find that belief objectively reasonable. In Justice 
Neilson’s view, it was not established that the trial 
judge erred in concluding  the officer honestly 
believed the accused was “arrestable” at the time of 
the search since the officer had seen drug  dealers use 
film containers many times. As for the objective 
grounds, the Court said this:
The evidence relevant to that determination 
includes the following. [The officer] had 28 
years’ experience with the Vancouver Police 
Department, ten years of which was with the 
drug squad. He estimated he had conducted 
50,000 drug investigations and made about 
4,000 arrests, 85 percent of which dealt with 
cocaine. In his experience, film containers were 
used extensively by drug  traffickers to store and 
secrete their drugs. He had encountered this 
several hundred times. He saw a vehicle with 
two occupants speed down a laneway and stop 
behind an apartment building, where the 
passenger quickly got out and went into the 
building. [The officer] asked the driver twice for 
proof of registration. On the second request, the 
driver turned toward the car door as if attempting 
to look for the registration, but made no effort to 
do so. Instead, he positioned himself in a manner 
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indicative of an attempt to shield his 
actions from [the officer], and dropped a 
film canister from his right hand onto 
the floor of the car on the driver’s side. 
He then turned back to [the officer] and 
said he could not find the registration.
The standard of proof for reasonable 
grounds is reasonable probability. This is 
something more than mere suspicion, 
but less than the civil standard of proof. 
In considering whether that standard has 
been met the circumstances must be 
considered in their totality, rather than 
on a piecemeal basis.
In the context of those principles, and 
viewed from the perspective of [the 
officer’s] knowledge and experience, I 
am satisfied that a reasonable person 
would conclude there were objectively 
reasonable grounds to believe the film 
canister held drugs. [The accused’s] 
attempt to surreptitiously dispose of that 
canister in the presence of police leads 
to an inevitable inference that it held 
something illegal. [The officer’s] 
extensive experience with the use of 
such containers in the drug trade forms 
a proper basis for a conclusion that it 
was reasonably probable it contained 
drugs. [paras. 51-53]
The accused’s secretive conduct was sufficient to 
raise the officer’s subjective suspicion to an objective 
level. The trial judge did not give too much 
deference to the officer’s intuition or experience and, 
therefore, did not effectively render the objective 
element of the inquiry meaningless. The officer had 
reasonable grounds to arrest the accused for a drug 
offence at the time of the search, the search was 
lawful as an incidental to arrest, and did not violate 
s. 8 of the Charter. 
Other Breaches
The Court of Appeal also found the police were not 
required to advise the accused of his right to counsel 
under s. 10(b) when they initially detained him to 
investigate the traffic violation. Although s. 10(b) is 
engaged when a suspect is detained for a motor 
vehicle offence, the police are not 
required to advise the detainee of the 
right to counsel. However, when the 
officer decided the accused was 
“arrestable” for possession of illicit 
drugs, the focus of the investigation 
changed from a traffic offence to a drug 
offence and the accused should, at this 
point, have been immediately advised 
of his right to counsel. Instead, the 
officer ordered him to the rear of the 
vehicle while he looked in the film 
canister. It wasn’t until he was arrested 
that he was advised of the reason for 
his arrest and his right to counsel. There 
was a breach of s. 10(b) when the 
detention continued after the officer 
formed the belief that the accused was 
in possession of illicit drugs. 
Although the trial judge’s s. 24(2) 
analysis was upheld, the accused’s 
conviction for possessing  cocaine for 
the purpose of trafficking  was set aside 
and a conviction for simple possession 
substituted. This was a circumstantial 
case and a conviction for possessing 
drugs for the purpose of trafficking 
required that offence to have been the 
only reasonable inference that could be drawn from 
the facts. Since there was information provided by 
the drug  expert that the trial judge failed to consider, 
along  with an absence of other indicia typically 
found with trafficking, simple possession was an 
equally reasonable conclusion.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Note-able Quote
“He who does not prevent a crime when he can, 
encourages it.” - Seneca
“The standard of 
proof for 
reasonable 
grounds is 
reasonable 
probability. This is 
something more 
than mere 
suspicion, but less 
than the civil 
standard of proof. 
In considering 
whether that 
standard has been 
met the 
circumstances must 
be considered in 
their totality, rather 
than on a 
piecemeal basis.”  
www.10-8.ca
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REASONABLE GROUNDS: 
A PRACTICAL, NON-TECHNICAL, 
COMMON-SENSE ASSESSMENT
R. v. Ballendine, 2011 BCCA 221
Italian police arrested a person 
involved in the production and 
in te rne t d i s t r ibut ion o f ch i ld 
pornography. His business records 
disclosed that approximately a year 
earlier a British Columbia resident (the accused) 
ordered over two dozen child-pornography videos 
(DVDs) by email in 2005.  That information was 
passed on to Canadian police in February of 2007. 
In September 2007 the police subsequently obtained 
a telewarrant under s. 487.1 of the Criminal Code 
(CC) to search the accused’s home for the DVDs as 
well as any computers/computer-related equipment. 
Although the police did not find any of the DVDs 
ordered from Italy, a forensic examination of the 
accused’s hard-drive disclosed a large number of 
other child-pornography videos and a short clip from 
one of the DVDs. The examination of another hard-
drive showed visits to child-pornography websites. 
A British Columbia Supreme Court judge upheld the 
warrant despite several objections raised by the 
accused about its validity and execution. The 
evidence was admitted and the accused was found 
guilty of both accessing  and possessing  child 
pornography.
The accused’s conviction was challenged to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal. He argued, 
among  other grounds, that the police officer 
submitting  the ITO by fax to the judicial justice of 
the peace (JJP) did not meet the impracticability 
requirement. He also contended that the information 
was stale and there was not reasonable grounds to 
believe the accused was in current possession of 
child pornography. Further, he suggested that the 
scope of the warrant was overly broad and that 
another search warrant was required before the 
police could conduct a forensic examination of the 
seized hard-drives. Justice Frankel, writing  the 
unanimous Court of Appeal’s decision, rejected all 
of these submissions. 
Telewarrant Impracticability
Under s.  487.1(1) of the CC, an application for a 
search warrant may be made by telephone or other 
means of telecommunication if the peace officer 
believes that it would be impracticable to appear 
personally before a justice to make the application. 
All telewarrant applications in British Columbia have 
been made to JJPs at its Justice Centre for about the 
last 10 years. In this case, the officer said it was 
impracticable for him to apply for a warrant in 
person because he had contacted the local 
courthouse and was told that a local JJP was not 
available. He did not contact a different courthouse 
located some 20 kilometers away, nor one located 
about an hour’s drive away, to see whether he could 
make his application in person at either one of those 
places. However, there was no evidence as to 
whether a JJP was available or would have been 
available to personally deal with an application for a 
search warrant at either of these other courthouses. 
The onus on proving  a s.8 Charter breach on a 
balance of probabilities was on the accused. 
Therefore, he was the one required to establish a 
violation of his rights by the police officer’s resort to 
the telewarrant process. But he failed in 
demonstrating  that the impracticability standard was 
not met. Justice Frankel stated:
Before submitting his application to the Justice 
Centre, [the officer] ascertained that there was 
no judicial officer at the Victoria courthouse who 
could deal with it on an in-person basis. That he 
did not make a similar inquiry at either the 
Colwood or Duncan courthouses does not, of 
itself, render his resort to the telewarrant process 
improper. Of those two locations, only Colwood 
could be considered a possible practical 
alternative.  However, ... there was no evidence 
that the application could have been dealt with 
on an in-person basis there.
It is important to keep in mind that the ITO [the 
officer] submitted by fax to the Justice Centre 
contained a statement that, on its face, satisfied 
the requirements of s.  487.1(1).  That being  so, 
the onus was on [the accused] to establish that 
an in-person attendance, either in Victoria or 
elsewhere, was not impracticable. This he failed 
to do.  [paras. 37-38]
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Reasonable Grounds for Current Possession
The accused submitted that there was nothing  in the 
ITO capable of supporting  reasonable grounds to 
believe that child pornography would likely be 
found at his residence when the warrant was 
executed. In his view, by September 2007, the 
information with respect to having  ordered child-
pornography videos in 2005 had 
become so stale as to be undeserving 
of any consideration. Justice Frankel, 
however, found this not so. He held 
that the trial judge did not err in 
finding  that there were reasonable 
grounds to believe that the videos 
ordered by the accused were at the 
premises:
A s h a s b e e n o f t s t a t e d , a 
reasonable-grounds determination 
is based on a practical, non-
technical, and common-sense assessment of the 
totality of the circumstances. In the case at bar, 
that determination includes a consideration not 
only of when the Marzola videos were ordered, 
but also their contents, how they were ordered, 
the number ordered, and the cost.
Merely because information is “dated” does not 
mean it is “stale”.   While the length of time that 
has passed is to be taken into account in a 
reasonable-grounds determination, it is but one 
factor.  [paras. 53-54]
And further:
In my view, the trial judge was correct when he 
concluded that, as a matter of common sense, it 
is reasonable to infer that someone who spends 
approximately $1000.00 to acquire more than 
two dozen child-pornography videos over the 
internet is likely be a collector of such 
prohibited material and is likely to retain them 
for a considerable time. [para. 57]
Thus, the passage of time alone did not necessarily 
demonstrate the information was stale.
Warrant Scope: Evidence of Residency
The accused had contended that the scope of the 
warrant was overly broad and should have been 
more limited. In rejecting  this argument, the Court of 
Appeal noted that not only were there reasonable 
grounds to believe that evidence related to child 
pornography would be found on computers 
(including  hard-drives), the warrant 
also allowed police to search for 
evidence of residency, which was not 
restricted to hard copies, but could 
also include evidence found on 
computers: 
In addition, as the warrant properly 
authorized a search for “evidence 
of residency”, the police were 
entitled to search for such evidence 
in electronic form.  In possessory 
offences, evidence of occupancy or 
residency is often tendered by the 
Crown to establish that an accused was in 
control of premises and, therefore, in possession 
of the prohibited item found therein.  For 
example, the presence or absence of such 
evidence is often an important fact in marihuana 
grow-operation prosecutions. ... It is self-evident 
that documents bearing  the name of, or related 
to, a particular person can serve to connect that 
person to the place where those documents 
were found. ...
In this case, [the accused] accepts that the police 
had reasonable grounds to search for what are 
sometimes referred to as “hard-copies” of such 
things as documents and photographs that could 
assist in establishing  who had control of the Old 
Esquimalt Road premises.  In my view, they 
equally had grounds to search for electronic 
versions of those things. An electronically-stored 
version of a letter or photograph that connects a 
person to premises is as cogent a piece of 
evidence as a hard-copy of the same thing. 
[references omitted, paras. 62-63]
“[A] reasonable-
grounds determination is 
based on a practical, 
non-technical, and 
common-sense 
assessment of the 
totality of the 
circumstances.”  
“An electronically-stored version of a letter or photograph that connects a person to 
premises is as cogent a piece of evidence as a hard-copy of the same thing.”  
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Hard-Drives Searches
The accused argued that the warrant gave the police 
authority to search his residence and seize any 
computers, but it did not authorize them to conduct 
a forensic examination of those devices.  He 
suggested that a second warrant was required before 
the police could examine them.  Justice Farnkel 
disagreed:
[T]here were reasonable grounds to believe that 
the Old Esquimalt Road premises were being 
used as a residence. There were also reasonable 
grounds to believe that a computer used in the 
commission of the offence being  investigated 
would be found there.  As well, the justice of the 
peace was made aware that an on-site forensic 
examination of any computer would be 
impracticable.  Far from being  implicit, the 
warrant expressly authorized the police to 
“search for and seize”, amongst other things, 
computers.
In this case, the police were authorized, on the 
basis of the warrant, to remove the computer 
and related equipment from the Old Esquimalt 
Road premises and to examine them for the 
purpose of locating any electronically-stored 
data covered by the warrant. [paras.69-70]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
LEGALITY OF SEARCH FLOWS 
FROM ARREST’S LAWFULNESS
R. v. Nicholson, 2011 ABCA 218 
After police received two tips from 
confidential informants that an 
individual named “Josh” was selling 
drugs, they set up surveillance on the 
accused. Although no suspicious 
activity was observed on five days of police 
surveillance, on another day police saw five 
encounters involving  the Escalade owned and driven 
by the accused. Unknown individuals were 
observed enter and exit the vehicle. Each of these 
encounters lasted between four and thirty seconds. 
Just over two weeks later police saw the accused 
driving  a Plymouth van owned by him. He did a 
heat check - a manouevre done by drug  traffickers to 
see if they are being  followed by the police. He 
made a U-turn, turned into a cul-de- sac, and waited 
in his vehicle before turning  back and continuing  in 
the same direction he was originally headed. Some 
25 minutes later a car pulled up beside the van in a 
grocery store parking  lot and its passenger entered 
the van carrying  what appeared to be a full 
knapsack. After about one minute the passenger 
exited the van with a knapsack that appeared to be 
lighter.  Believing  the accused was a drug  trafficker 
and that a drug  transaction had taken place, the 
investigator instructed an uniformed police officer to 
arrest him for drug  trafficking. Shortly afterwards the 
van was searched without a warrant as an incident 
to arrest. A blackberry and cell phone were seen on 
the floor and a black Louis Vuitton bag  was between 
the driver and passenger seats. It contained a plastic 
bag  with 500 grams of cocaine. The accused was 
read his Charter  rights, cautioned, and expressed a 
desire to speak to a lawyer, but was not allowed to 
do so until some nine hours later. The investigator 
wanted to search the accused’s residence before 
permitting  a phone call. During  this time, two 
attempts were made to question the accused before 
being  he was given the opportunity to exercise his 
desire to speak with counsel. 
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench the 
judge found that the vehicle search was reasonable 
and therefore s. 8 of the Charter was not breached. 
However, he concluded that s. 10(b) - the right to 
counsel - had been violated because of the delay in 
providing  the accused access to counsel. He, 
characterized the police conduct as blatant, 
unreasonable, and unacceptable. The evidence 
arising  from the seizure was nonetheless admitted 
under s. 24(2). The accused was convicted of 
possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.  
The accused then appealed his conviction to the 
Alberta Court of Appeal contending, in part, that the 
trial judge erred in finding  that police had 
reasonable grounds to arrest him. The search that 
followed was therefore unlawful and the judge 
should have excluded the evidence. Furthermore, he 
submitted that the judge failed to consider whether 
the Crown had proven possession beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
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Arrest
The Court of Appeal found the 
accused’s arrest and vehicle 
search to be lawful:
The legal i ty of a search 
incident to arrest is derived 
from the legality of the arrest. 
The person instructing  the 
arrest must subjectively believe 
that there are reasonable 
grounds to make the arrest and 
t h o s e g r o u n d s m u s t b e 
objectively reasonable. The 
trial judge noted that [the 
of f icer] tes t i f ied that he 
believed the accused was 
engaged in drug  trafficking  and instructed a 
uniformed officer to arrest him.  The trial judge 
referred ... to seven instances of evidence which 
gave rise to that conclusion (the tips from two 
confidential informants, the five exchanges with 
other vehicles on April 1, 2008  and the 
exchange with the black Acura on April 17, 
2008) in concluding  that [the officer] had 
reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest. 
While the trial judge did not 
use the word “objectively 
reasonable”, these seven 
instances can logically be 
interpreted as meeting the 
objective component of the 
test. (references omitted, 
para. 15]
The trial judge properly 
concluded that the officer had 
reasonable grounds for instructing  the accused’s 
arrest. Thus, there was no s. 8 infringement. 
Possession 
Proving  possession beyond a reasonable 
doubt is an essential element of the 
offence of possessing  cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking. Here, the accused 
“was the owner and sole occupant of a 
motor vehicle in which a Louis Vuitton 
bag  containing  500 grams of cocaine 
was found within arms reach of his 
position as the driver of the vehicle,” 
said the Court. “The finding  of a 
prohibited item within a motor vehicle 
owned and operated by an accused is 
prima facie proof of possession by the 
accused.” Even though the trial judge 
made no express finding  that the 
accused was in possession of the substance seized 
from his van, it was inevitable that the judge would 
have concluded that the evidence established 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was in 
possession of it.   
Section 24(2) Charter
The Court of Appeal also agreed that the evidence 
was still admissible even though the 
accused’s s. 10(b) Charter  rights were 
breached. There was no connection 
between the s. 10(b) infringement, which 
occurred after the search and seizure of 
the drugs, and the reliable and critical 
nature of the evidence. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
“The legality of a search 
incident to arrest is 
derived from the legality 
of the arrest. The person 
instructing the arrest must 
subjectively believe that 
there are reasonable 
grounds to make the 
arrest and those grounds 
must be objectively 
reasonable.”  
“The finding of a prohibited 
item within a motor vehicle 
owned and operated by an 
accused is prima facie 
proof of possession by the 
accused.”  
A Word of Caution
Although the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld the accused’s conviction, they noted that this case “was certainly not a 
model police investigation.” The police failed to follow basic police procedures, such as:
police did not tag and label the bag containing the drugs seized from the accused’s vehicle on the day it was seized;
police did not respond to several requests to attend the police detachment to identify the seizure;
police denied the accused’s right to counsel for about nine hours from the time of his arrest, during which two attempts 
were made to question him after he had asserted his desire to speak with counsel and before being given that 
opportunity. The trial judge characterized this conduct as blatant, unreasonable and unacceptable. 
The justices did not want their judgment to be taken as condoning these investigative failings. 
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REASONABLENESS OF SAFETY 
SEARCH TO BE DETERMINED IN 
LIGHT OF PARTICULAR FACTS 
R. v. Aucoin, 2011 NSCA 64
The accused was stopped driving 
shortly after midnight in a downtown 
area during  a busy Apple Blossom 
weekend. The licence plate on his 
car was for another type of motor 
vehicle. While checking  the insurance and 
registration for the vehicle and the accused’s newly 
issued licence, the officer smelled alcohol and 
demanded a roadside screening  test. The accused 
was asked to step out of his vehicle and go back to 
the police car, two or three car lengths away. He was 
told he was not under arrest and was placed in the 
back seat of the police car with the door open and 
his feet outside. Although the screening  test 
indicated a result (20 mg%) below the legal limit, 
the accused was still in breach of a zero tolerance 
policy for a newly licenced driver. The officer 
decided to issue the accused a summary offence 
ticket for having  alcohol in his system as a newly-
licensed driver, so he wanted 
to put the accused in the back 
seat of the police car while he 
wrote the ticket in the front 
seat. The accused’s vehicle 
was going  to be towed and 
the officer was concerned the 
accused could walk away and 
disappear while he was 
writing  the ticket. The officer 
did a safety pat-down and felt 
something  in the accused’s 
right pocket. When asked 
what it was, the accused said it was ecstasy. He was 
arrested and two small baggies containing  100 green 
pills (which later turned out not to be ecstasy) and 
eight bags of cocaine were removed from his pocket. 
He was subsequently charged with possessing 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking  as well as 
possessing  a substance held out to be ecstasy for the 
purpose of trafficking.  
At trial in New Brunswick Provincial Court the 
officer testified it was his standard practice, 
especially when it was busy and alcohol was 
involved, to place a person in the back seat of his 
police car while he wrote the ticket up as well as 
perform a pat-down search for weapons. He wanted 
to ensure his safety, and that of the accused, even 
though he had no idea what the accused had in his 
possession that could be used for harm. The trial 
judge concluded that the accused's s. 8 Charter 
rights had not been violated by the pat-down search. 
“Police officers face any number of risks everyday in 
the carrying  out of their policing  function, and are 
entitled to go about their work secure in the 
knowledge that risks are minimized to the greatest 
extent possible,” she said. “Where an officer has 
reasonable grounds to believe that his or her safety 
is at risk, the officer may engage in a protective pat-
down search of the detained individual. The search 
must be grounded in objectively discernible facts to 
prevent ‘fishing  expeditions’ on the basis of 
irrelevant or discriminatory factors.” She found this 
case involved some very unusual circumstances. It 
was late at night and there was no place to write out 
the ticket other than in the police car. Plus, it would 
have been inappropriate and unlawful for 
the officer to leave the accused seated in 
his own vehicle; it would have been a 
continuation of the offence. Finally, it was a 
very busy time and there were many people 
around. “Given all the circumstances, it 
was reasonable for [the officer] to request 
[the accused] to be seated in his police car 
while he was writing  out the ticket,” said 
the trial judge. “And it was also reasonable 
in all the circumstances for [the officer] to 
do the very quick pat-down search that he 
did, and the short conversation that he had 
with [the accused] before [he] was placed in the 
back seat of that vehicle. Office[r] safety is a 
legitimate concern in this particular fact-situation.” 
After an expert said that the cocaine was possessed 
for trafficking, rather than for personal use, the 
accused was convicted of possessing  cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking  but not the ecstasy related 
charge. He was sentenced to two-years in prison.
“We are to consider the 
reasonableness of [the 
officer’s] actions in light 
of the particular 
circumstances he faced, 
not in the context of 
other fact situations that 
may arise.”  
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The accused appealed his conviction to the Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal arguing, among  other 
grounds, that the trial judge erred in finding  that his 
s. 8 rights had not been breached by the pat-down 
search.  
The Safety Search
A search incidental to the police power of 
investigative detention is a warrantless search and is 
presumed unreasonable unless it can be justified. 
This requires a determination of whether the search 
was authorized by law, if the authorizing  law itself 
was reasonable, and if the manner in which the 
search was conducted was reasonable. In agreeing 
that the search was reasonable, Justice Hamilton, for 
the two member majority, stated:
The issuance of the motor vehicle 
ticket to [the accused] was the final 
step of [the officer’s] investigation 
into [the accused’s] breach of the 
MVA. He had a duty to complete 
this stage of the process. He had to 
do this in a situation where he had 
essentially no back-up, it was late 
at night, he needed the light in the 
front seat of the police car to write 
the ticket, he could not place the 
[accused] in the car he had been 
driving  because it was being 
removed, and because it may be a 
continuing offence given the 
alcohol in the [accused’s] blood, 
and he was concerned the 
[accused] may take off if left on his 
own outside the police car. In such 
circumstances, the brief detention 
of the [accused] in the back seat of 
the police car is within the scope 
of the doctrine of investigative 
detention and is reasonable. 
Having  decided to place [the 
accused] in the back seat of the 
police car, it was also reasonable 
for the officer to do a pat-down 
search to ensure that the [accused] 
had no weapons that he could use 
to harm the officer or himself.
That is not to say that in other circumstances, if 
[the officer] followed "his usual practice" of 
placing  someone to whom he is going  to issue 
an alcohol - related motor vehicle ticket in the 
back seat of his car and doing a pat-down 
search, such detention and pat-down search 
would not be a breach of s. 8  of the Charter. We 
are to consider the reasonableness of [the 
officer’s] actions in light of the particular 
circumstances he faced, not in the context of 
other fact situations that may arise. [para. 26-28]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
A Different Opinion
Justice Beveridge, unlike his colleagues, concluded 
that the search was not authorized by law and was 
unreasonable under s. 8. Although the officer had 
lawful authority to stop the accused 
under the MVA and to engage in a 
more intrusive detention once the 
smell of alcohol was detected, he did 
not have carte blanche to do what he 
did. There was no arrest to trigger the 
long  recognized common law power 
of the police to search incident to a 
lawful arrest. Instead, he was 
detained pursuant to an impaired 
driving  investigation which ended 
when the accused tested below the 
legal limit. By then, the officer was 
merely engaged in writing  a summary 
offence ticket for a newly licensed 
driver having  alcohol in their blood. 
The officer’s direction for the accused 
to sit in the rear of the police car 
created the officer safety issue. Had 
the officer just wrote the ticket 
without requiring  the accused to sit in 
the rear of the police car, there were 
no officer safety concerns and no 
need to search. Furthermore, the 
search itself went beyond one 
reasonably limited to locating 
weapons. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“ In such circumstances, 
the brief detention of the 
[accused] in the back 
seat of the police car is 
within the scope of the 
doctrine of investigative 
detention and is 
reasonable. Having 
decided to place [the 
accused] in the back 
seat of the police car, it 
was also reasonable for 
the officer to do a pat-
down search to ensure 
that the [accused] had 
no weapons that he 
could use to harm the 
officer or himself.”
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POLICE TO CONSIDER CHARTER 
IN THEIR ASSESSMENTS
R. v. Timmons, 2011 NSCA 39
 
At about 10:30 pm, a 24-year-old 
woman (Nadine) called her mother. 
She said she was having  a fight with 
the accused, with whom she was 
living, and wanted to be picked up. 
Since the family vehicle was not available, the 
mother called police to have them go for her 
daughter. The mother told the dispatcher that Nadine 
was being  abused and that the accused “deals in 
drugs and has a big  Rottweiler.” The mother said she 
did not know whether or not there were weapons in 
the accused's house. Two police officers receiving 
the call began to search for the accused's home 
since the mother did not know exactly where it was 
and had only provided a very vague description. 
Police called the mother back to get more details. 
She again confirmed her belief that her daughter was 
being  abused and provided a cell phone number. 
Police called the daughter. She laughed and said, "so 
my mother called." The daughter insisted that she 
was fine, did not need the police, and refused to tell 
police where she was located. Nonetheless, the 
police located the accused’s residence, arriving  at 
just after midnight, approximately two hours after 
the original call was reported. Police were aware the 
accused had outstanding  charges for obstructing 
police and impaired driving, considered him violent, 
and believed he was involved in drugs. 
Shortly after arriving, a scream was heard coming 
from inside the residence. Seeing  a dog  dish and 
chain outside, suggesting  a possible guard dog,  
police drew their weapons. They pounded on the 
door, demanded entry, and ordered the dog  be 
secured. The daughter opened the door and said 
everything  was fine. She said that no assault had 
taken place and there was only a verbal argument. 
She had wanted to leave, but the accused did not 
want her to take his truck. An officer saw a person 
(the accused) lying  on a bed, went straight to him, 
asked him to get out of bed, and patted him down 
for officer safety reasons. The house was then 
cleared. Each room was entered and spaces that 
could hold a person were checked to ensure that no 
one was hiding  and that there were no firearms 
present. Seeing  evidence of drugs in plain view (eg. 
marihuana on top of a clothes basket, a garbage bag 
containing  dried marihuana plants in the kitchen, 
170 marihuana seeds in a basket in the basement, 
Miracle Grow, buckets, insulation venting, lamp, 
timers, heater, dark plastic) police obtained a 
warrant authorizing a search of the premises.
 
The trial judge ruled that the police had a 
responsibility to enter the residence whether invited 
or not. “The perceived scream meant that either [the 
daughter] was lying  about being  okay, or had been 
subsequently threatened, or that someone else inside 
was in trouble,” said the judge. “Police had to 
investigate and check the entire house for the 
presence of other persons.” The judge found there 
was no qualitative difference between a 911 call 
arising  from within the residence and one where the 
mother had phoned police out of concern for her 
daughter's safety. The entry by the police was not 
only justified but entirely necessary. The judge also 
held that the police were justified in checking  the 
house to ensure that there were no other occupants 
and in searching  the accused to ensure he had no 
weapon. There were no Charter  breaches and the 
accused was convicted of cocaine and marijuana 
possession and for possessing  marijuana for the 
purposes of trafficking. The accused then challenged 
the trial judge’s ruling  to the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal.
 
Warrantless Entry and Search
 
The accused argued that the police violated his 
rights under s. 8  when they entered and searched his 
home without a warrant. First, the call was not a 911 
call or a distress call made from the home. Second, 
the police were not justified in entering  when 
Nadine opened the door and said that she was fine. 
Third, once the police had entered, clearing  the 
house was not justified.
 
The Court of Appeal noted that an individual is 
entitled to privacy in his or her own home. “The 
unauthorized presence of state agents such as the 
police constitutes an invasion of that privacy,” said 
Justice Olund. But there are exceptions, such as hot 
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pursuit, exigent circumstances, or statutory 
authorization. In this case, the police entry before 
the search warrant was issued was a warrantless 
search and prima facie unreasonable. For the search 
to be lawful it would need to be authorized at  
common law.
 
The Court of Appeal rejected the accused’s argument 
that the complainant’s call was simply a request by a 
mother looking  for a ride for her daughter, and not 
akin to a 911 call. “In the particular circumstances 
of this case, the fact that the call which triggered 
police response was not through 911, by the alleged 
victim, or from the house is not material,” said 
Justice Olund. It was reasonable for the police to 
search for the alleged victim and go to the accused’s 
home. Although Nadine told police at the door that 
she was fine, her statements could have been 
involuntary and made pursuant to threats of 
violence. She was still inside with the person 
reported to have abused her and was possibly under 
his control. If they had simply accepted what was 
said at the door at face value and left, the officers 
could have been abandoning  an alleged victim of 
abuse in the company of her alleged abuser and in a 
remote and secluded location, without ever seeing 
or speaking with her alone.
 
The police entry, however, was unlawful and thus 
unreasonable under s. 8  of the Charter. The person 
who had been reportedly abused came and opened 
the door. “If the police were concerned that her 
assurances that all was well might not be genuine or 
made of her own free will, they could have asked 
[the daughter] to step outside the house [and] could 
then have questioned her face to face and away from 
any possible influence by the accused,” said Justice 
Olund, continuing:
 
If she had been in any danger, Nadine then 
could have simply left with the five officers. She 
had been located and was safe with them. There 
would have been no reason or need to enter the 
residence.
 
The police had no information that there was 
anyone in the house other than [the accused] 
and Nadine Shaw. However if, because of the 
perceived scream or otherwise, they were 
concerned that there might be anyone else in the 
house who was in trouble, they could have 
obtained that information from Nadine Shaw, 
outside the house. They could also have asked 
whether there were any firearms or weapons 
there. If she said that there was someone who 
needed assistance, the officers would have 
reasonable grounds to believe that that person's 
safety was a risk. They then would have been 
justified in entering  the house to locate and 
protect him or her.
 
If Nadine refused to step outside the house when 
asked, the police might have suspected that [the 
accused] was threatening her from behind the 
door or farther away, and that he was armed. In 
that case, they would have had to decide how 
n e x t t o p r o c e e d . D e p e n d i n g o n t h e 
circumstances, one reasonable option might 
well be a warrantless entry with the object of 
protecting Nadine's safety.
 
But the police did not ask Nadine to step outside 
the house. Instead three officers entered. Nadine 
Shaw told them that she was fine. There was no 
one nearby or who was interfering with their 
conversation. The only person in view was a 
man lying on a bed in a bedroom. There was no 
evidence that he either moved or reached for 
something suddenly, or indeed at al l . 
Nevertheless the police went straight into the 
bedroom, had him get up, did a pat-down 
search to which the man cooperated, and then 
proceeded to search his house. [paras. 43-46]
 
The trial judge failed to consider alternatives to the 
warrantless entry and the search of the home. 
Despite the police often being  required to make 
rapid assessments and decisions in potentially 
dangerous situations, they must always include in 
their considerations the rights of individuals under 
the Charter. The accused’s appeal was allowed, his 
convictions were set aside, and a s. 24(2) analysis 
was left for a new trial.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Once it has been demonstrated  that a search is a warrantless 
one,  the burden is on the Crown to show, on a balance of 
probabilities, that the search was a reasonable one.  A search 
will be reasonable if it is  authorized by law, if the law itself  is 
reasonable, and  if the manner in which the search was 
conducted is reasonable.
Volume 11 Issue 4 - July/August 2011
PAGE 43
DETAINEE UNDERSTOOD RIGHT 
TO COUNSEL: s. 10(b) NOT 
BREACHED
R. v. J.W.C., 2011 ONCA 550
The accused, who suffered from 
bipolar disorder and depression, was 
a voluntary patient in a hospital’s 
psychiatric unit. He was receiving 
treatment that included medication, 
therapy, recreational programming, and community 
passes. He called police one day from the hospital 
and said that he wanted to confess to sexual 
offences that he had committed in the past when he 
worked as a residential counsellor at various group 
homes for persons with special needs. The victims 
were developmentally handicapped, unable to 
communicate or testify, and never made complaints 
against the accused. Two officers went to the 
hospital and confirmed that the accused had called 
the police. He agreed to go to the station for an 
interview.  He was then taken to the police cruiser 
where he was informed of his right to counsel.  He 
agreed that he understood his rights. When asked if 
he wanted to call a lawyer he said, “Not right now.”  
He was then taken to the police station and was 
again advised of his right to counsel. He said he 
understood and when asked again whether he 
wished to call a lawyer said, “Ah I don’t know.” The 
interview began and the accused explained that he 
had been a voluntary patient at the hospital. As the 
interview continued, he admitted to sexually 
assaulting  a number of patients who were in his 
care. He provided details of the assaults, identified a 
number of the victims by their first name or their 
bedroom location, and gave particulars of the 
facilities where the assaults took place.
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
accused claimed, in part, that his s. 10(b) Charter 
rights were breached. During  a voir dire he said that 
he did not fully understand what the officer was 
saying  to him. While he understood he could call a 
free lawyer, he did not know how to do so. He said 
“I don’t know” because he was confused and 
nervous. He was trying  to think about whether or not 
he should have a lawyer.  As for his statement, he 
said it was untrue and the product of voices telling 
him that he had committed sexual offences and that 
he must be punished and would be killed in jail. The 
trial judge concluded that the accused had a 
reasonable time to consider whether he should 
exercise his right to counsel. He was given his right 
to counsel twice, once in the police car on the way 
to the station and again at the station.  There was 
about 12 minutes between the first and second 
cautions to consider his right to counsel and make a 
decision whether to exercise that right.  Plus, the 
interview began with open-ended questions as 
opposed to questions immediately focused on the 
crimes. “I find that the twelve or so minutes between 
the first reading  of his right to counsel and caution to 
the beginning  of the interview gave a person of his 
education, admittedly depressed at the time, 
sufficient time to ask for counsel,” said the judge. He 
was convicted of several sexual offences. 
The accused appealed his convictions to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal submitting, among  other grounds, 
that when he answered “Ah I don’t know”, it was an 
equivocal response, and the police were required to 
obtain a clear waiver that he did not wish to consult 
counsel. After all, the police knew the accused was 
suffering  from depression and had been removed 
from a psychiatric facility. In his view, his confession 
should have been excluded under s. 24(2). 
Right to Counsel
In rendering  judgment, Justice Rosenberg, speaking 
for the Court of Appeal, first summarized the s. 10(b) 
framework. He noted there are two components of 
the right to counsel:  
1. the informational  component: police must tell 
the detainee about their right to consult counsel, 
which includes the availability of duty counsel.
2. the implementation component:  police must 
give the detainee an opportunity to exercise their 
right to counsel. This implies a duty on the 
police to hold off questioning  until the detainee 
has had a reasonable opportunity to consult with 
counsel.  In some circumstances, a detainee is 
entitled to a second opportunity to consult 
counsel: (1) where the police seek to resort to 
non-routine procedures involving  the detainee, 
such as asking  the detainee to participate in a 
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line-up; (2) there has been a change in jeopardy 
because the investigation has taken a new and 
more serious turn as events unfold; and (3) as 
events proceed, there is reason to question the 
detainee’s understanding  of the right to consult 
counsel.
In this case, however, the accused’s response to the 
second caution, “Ah, I don’t know”, was not a 
positive indication that he did not understand the 
right to counsel. He said he understood and 
admitted as much on the voir dire. “‘Ah, I don’t 
know’ was not an expression of uncertainty about 
the content of the right,” said Justice Rosenberg. 
“Nor was it an invocation of the right to counsel 
and, by itself, would not trigger an obligation on the 
police to obtain a clear waiver.” Even after he said 
“Ah, I don’t know”, the officer confirmed with the 
accused that he understood his rights.
As for the accused’s psychiatric condition, the Court 
of Appeal stated:
Even taking into account the [accused’s] 
psychiatric condition as was appropriate, there is 
nothing  to indicate that the [accused] did not 
understand that he had the right to immediately 
consult counsel, if he wished to do so. There is 
no aspect of the interview that indicates that the 
[accused] did not understand his right to counsel 
or that he was in any way deprived of the 
opportunity to exercise that right had he chosen 
to do so.
In addition, the police were not required to go 
further and obtain a clearer waiver from the 
accused. He understood his jeopardy and there was 
no reason to doubt his understanding  of the right to 
counsel. This was not a case where the detainee was 
unsure of the nature of the allegations. It was the 
accused who contacted police. He had exclusive 
knowledge and control over the information about 
the abuse he said he committed:  
In another case, a particular detainee’s mental 
illness could be a very important factor, that 
might well lead to a finding that the detainee did 
not understand the right to consult counsel.  
However, in this case the [accused] was a 
voluntary patient at the hospital and his treating 
physician was of the opinion that it was 
appropriate that he be allowed to participate in 
the police interview that he sought. Moreover, 
the [accused] understood his right to counsel 
and appreciated that he could have exercised 
that right. He had adequate opportunity to 
consider whether he would do so. In the face of 
the [accused’s] statement that he did not know 
whether to consult counsel, [the officer] 
reiterated in plain language that the [accused] 
could have immediate access to free legal 
advice.   Given these circumstances, in my view, 
the police were not required to do more than 
[the officer] did.  [para. 30]
The accused failed to establish a s. 10(b) violation 
and his appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
The Police Station Caution
OFFICER: Um now I’m gonna read a couple of things to you. I’ve 
already read them to you once but I’m gonna go over them again.
ACCUSED: Okay
OFFICER: Alright. Ah it’s my duty to inform you that you have the 
right to obtain and instruct [counsel] without delay. You have the 
right to telephone any lawyer you wish. You also have the right to 
free advice from a Legal Aid Lawyer. If you are charged with an 
offence you may apply to the Ontario Legal Aid Plan for legal 
assistance. 1-800-265-0451 is a toll free number that will put you in 
contact with Legal Aid Duty [Counsel] Lawyer for free legal advice 
right now, do you understand?
ACCUSED: Mm huh
OFFICER: Ah do you wish to call a lawyer now?
ACCUSED: Ah I don’t know.
OFFICER: Okay. Um but you do understand this [is] a, a phone 
number for free legal advice?
ACCUSED: Mm huh
OFFICER: And that we’ll provide you with an opportunity to call 
that number, you do understand that right?
ACCUSED: Right
OFFICER: Um do you wish to say anything in an, now you’re not 
charged with anything right now. Um do you wish to say anything ah 
you’re not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so but 
whatever you say may be given in evidence do you understand that?
ACCUSED: Mm huh
OFFICER: We’re recording this and that we can use it as evidence?
ACCUSED: Okay
OFFICER: Okay. So what I’ll do is I’ll, I’ll get you to um, ah just tell 
me a little bit about yourself and tell me why you called today. Okay? 
